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INTRODUCTION 
Sunk in the bottom of a depressed economy, we look back on 
frivolous purchases of the past with a mixture of awe and disgust.  
Someone bought a 603 carat diamond for a cool $12 million.1  
Others sipped on $2 million dollar bottles of Cognac.2  People 
magazine, instead, dropped $14 million dollars for rights to the 
first photos of celebrities Angelina Jolie’s and Brad Pitt’s newborn 
twins, Vivienne and Knox.3  This figure is hardly an outlier.  
Actresses,4 musicians,5 models,6 and sports figures7 have all 
pocketed huge sums of money by auctioning the rights to publish 
the first photos of their infants, along with a story about the 
growing family, often approved by the parents before publication.  
Magazines are willing to pay the exorbitant amounts because, in 
theory, the price is offset by the massive sales of the issue of the 
magazine featuring the exclusive baby photographs plastered on 
the cover. 
The influence of American celebrities is felt worldwide.  For 
example, the infamous U.K. tabloid The Sun devotes an entire 
 
 1 The Lesotho Promise diamond, one of the largest diamonds ever found, sold at 
auction for $12.36 million. See Reuters, Huge African Diamond Sells for over $12 
Million, MSNBC ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15195458/. 
 2 Henri IV Dudognon Heritage, aged for more than one hundred years and sold in a 
jeweled bottle, sells for approximately $2 million. See William Dowd, Dowd on Drinks, 
Two Million Reasons This Cognac Is Claiming a World Record, TIMES UNION, Feb. 28, 
2008, at E3, available at http://blog.timesunion.com/dowdondrinks/2-million-reasons-
this-cognac-has-a-world-record/384/. 
 3 People received the U.S. rights to the photographs and accompanying story, while 
U.K. magazine Hello! received the rights to the photos in the U.K.; the companies split 
the $14 million cost. Associated Press, Jolie-Pitt Baby Pics Fetch $14 Million, MSNBC 
ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25967334.  The couple donated 
the money they received from the sale to charity. See id. 
 4 See Marcus Baram & Sheila Marikar, Are Celebrity Baby Photos Really Worth 
Millions?, ABC NEWS, July 16, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/entertainment/story?id 
=5378829&page=1. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Former Playboy model, Kendra Wilkinson, posed with her new son on the cover of 
Ok! magazine. Introducing Kendra’s Baby Boy, OK!, Dec. 17, 2009, at cover page. 
 7 OK! magazine purchased the first pictures of actress Bridget Moynahan’s newborn 
son with NFL star Tom Brady for $100,000. See The Inside Track, Bouncing Baby Brady 
Graces Cover of OK Magazine, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 26, 2007, at 19, available at 
http://bostonherald.com.nyud.net/track/inside_track/view.bg?articleid=1034114&cache_i
nterval=14121. 
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section called “Bizarre USA” to American “showbiz;”8 Japan 
frequently features Hollywood celebrities as spokespeople in 
commercials;9 and actors confronting local customs are just as 
highly publicized, such as when actor Richard Gere attended a 
charity event in India.10  American “celebrity” status, long a 
valuable commodity domestically, is increasingly advantageous in 
foreign markets, which are now flooded with celebrity news from 
across the globe. 
Publicity rights have changed in the United States as 
celebrities’ role in society has changed.  The public’s attitude has 
turned from adulation of celebrities in the past (e.g., the public’s 
fascination and respect for first lady Jackie Kennedy) to a sense of 
schadenfreude (e.g., the public’s encouragement of the rise and fall 
of pop star Britney Spears).  Although the attitude of the public 
appears to have grown more malicious or spiteful in recent years, 
celebrities benefit from this increased level of attention to the 
details of their personal lives.  Exclusive photos of lavish celebrity 
weddings,11 front-page “coming out” stories,12 and pictures of stars 
 
 8 See Gordon Smart’s Bizarre USA, SUN, available at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/ 
homepage/showbiz/bizarre/usa/. 
 9 For example, both Keanu Reeves and Sean Connery have appeared in Suntory 
Whiskey commercials. See Suntory, http://www.suntory.com/yamazaki/main.html (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2010); see also A Tale of Two Whiskies, http://sickbobby.blogspot 
.com/2008/04/tale-of-two-whiskies.html (Apr. 27, 2008, 21:57 JST).  The practice of 
celebrity cameos was satirized by the film Lost in Translation, where Bill Murray 
portrayed an aging American actor shilling for, incidentally, Suntory Whiskey. See id. 
 10 See, e.g., Gere-Shetty Kiss Provokes Outrage in India, CBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2007, 
http://www.cbc.ca/arts/media/story/2007/04/16/gere-shetty-kiss.html.  Richard Gere 
hosted an AIDS awareness event in India with a Bollywood actress, but his resulting 
behavior (i.e., a playful, but public, kiss exchanged with the actress that led to a warrant 
issued for this “obscene act”) generated more press than the actual event itself. Gere 
Faces Indian Arrest Warrant, BBC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
entertainment/6596163.stm. 
 11 “Celebutante” Khloe Kardashian and fiancé Lamar Odom sold the rights to pictures 
of their September 2009 wedding to Us Weekly for $300,000—perhaps a sign that the 
economy is turning around. See Reid Cherner & Tom Weir, $300K for Odom-Kardashian 
Wedding Photos?, USA TODAY,  Sept. 18, 2009, http://blogs.usatoday.com/gameon/2009 
/09/300k-for-odomkardashian-wedding-photos.html. 
 12 See Lance Bass: I’m Gay, PEOPLE, Aug. 7, 2006, at cover page & 86, available at 
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,26334,1219142,00.html (noting that Lance 
Bass’s story was “exclusively” given to People). 
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acting “just like us”13 sell magazines to the voyeuristic public, but 
they also enhance the marketability of those who appear on their 
pages, whether willingly or unwillingly.  However, when 
celebrities willingly invite news coverage of their private lives, 
their claims that their privacy should be protected are undermined. 
However pleased they are by positive publicity, celebrities 
bristle at unflattering appearances in tabloid magazines and can sue 
the publication under a number of claims, such as the right of 
publicity.  This right allows a person to control or prevent use of 
her image, as well as to profit from any uses thereof.14  
Enforcement of this right indirectly allows a celebrity to protect his 
or her often highly guarded privacy.  Many states recognize the 
existence of this right in some form or another, basing it on a 
convoluted history of privacy expectations and intellectual 
property rights.15  However, some states contemplate a person’s 
actions (such as inviting a tabloid to take photographs of children 
or a wedding), and find that such actions undermine the 
expectation of privacy and conflict with the public’s interest to 
hear about events—and the tabloids’ right of free speech under the 
First Amendment.16  Courts have had difficulty reconciling the 
privacy and pecuniary interests of the celebrity with those of the 
news-hungry public and have reached conflicting decisions both 
among and within jurisdictions.17 
This Note addresses the fractured state of the right of publicity 
in the various states that recognize it and promotes the necessary 
development of a comprehensive federal scheme.  Part I of this 
Note considers the development of the right of publicity in its 
common law and statutory forms, its roots in common law 
property and privacy rights, and the historical trend towards 
federalization of other intellectual property rights.  Part I also 
explores the history of tabloid culture and public fascination with 
 
 13 The “Just Like Us” feature is a regular portion of Us Weekly, showing pictures of 
celebrities doing ordinary things that purportedly make them just like the rest of us.  See, 
e.g., Carolyn Davis, Stars—They’re Just Like Us!, US WKLY., Nov. 23, 2009, at 26–27. 
 14 See infra Part I.B. 
 15 See infra Part I.B.3. 
 16 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 17 See infra Part II.B.4. 
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celebrity figures.  Part II of this Note outlines the diverging 
scholarly views of a future for the right of publicity, reflected in 
conflicting case law at the state level.  This Part also analyzes the 
newsworthiness exception that narrows the protection of the right 
of publicity in some states.  Finally, Part III of this Note 
recommends the development of a less protective federal statute 
that recognizes that the right of publicity has outgrown its privacy 
roots and focuses instead on the restrictions set out by the 
newsworthiness exception. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part explores the common law origins of the right of 
publicity, first surveying the history of its analogues in the fields of 
privacy and property rights.  This Part then reviews several state 
statutes that grant a right of publicity.  Finally, this Part examines 
the seedy but lucrative history of tabloid magazines and the 
public’s obsession with all things celebrity, as exemplified by the 
short-lived trend of multi-million dollar auctions of the exclusive 
rights to photographs of celebrities’ babies. 
A. Influences from Other Areas of Law 
The right of publicity, despite its frequent enforcement by 
those who are household names, applies to the reclusive common 
man as well as to the often-photographed celebrity.18  The right 
encompasses both privacy and property aspects: on one hand, the 
enforcer of the right seeks to vindicate an invasion of his privacy, 
and on the other, seeks to maintain control over profits that arise 
from use of his image.19  Typically, to state a cause of action for a 
 
 18 Professor J. Thomas McCarthy notes that, “[t]he right of publicity is not merely a 
legal right of the ‘celebrity,’ but is a right inherent to everyone to control the commercial 
use of identity and persona and recover in court damages and the commercial value of an 
unpermitted taking.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 
1:4 (2009).  Nonetheless, this Note focuses less on “everyone” and more on the 
“celebrity.” 
 19 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2010) (describing the enforceable right of 
publicity for unauthorized use of one’s image); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 
(McKinney 2009) (same); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2009) 
(same). 
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violation of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the 
validity of his or her right of publicity; and (2) that this right has 
been infringed upon by the defendant(s).20  Both interpretations of 
state common law and statutory codifications of the right of 
publicity require each of the two prongs.21  The second prong 
usually requires that the plaintiff’s name or likeness be used for the 
benefit of the defendant (whether for commercial profit or other 
benefit) without the consent of the plaintiff in a manner likely to 
cause harm to the plaintiff.22 
In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit gave name 
to the “right of publicity” in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc.,23 recognizing a growing trend in both privacy 
and property law.24  In the fifty years since Haelen, the right of 
publicity has been recognized under the common law of, or has 
been statutorily defined by, many states.  Twenty-eight of the fifty 
states recognize some form of the right of publicity, either by 
statute or as a right existing under the common law.25  Seven states 
have statutory provisions that “encompass the right of publicity.” 26  
Another ten states have privacy statutes that embody the 
characteristics of the right of publicity.27  The courts in the 
 
 20 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 3:2. 
 21 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51.  The common law 
action in some states requires similar, if not the same, elements: “A common law cause of 
action for appropriation of name or likeness [in California] may be pleaded by alleging 
(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name 
or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and 
(4) resulting injury.” Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 22 See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347–48. 
 23 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 24 See id. at 868 (“[One has] the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture . . . .  This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”). 
 25 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3 nn.8–9. 
 26 See id. § 6:3. California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 540.08 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2010)), Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1-60 (2001)), Kentucky 
(KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2741.01 (LexisNexis 2009)), Texas (TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001–.015 
(Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2009)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2007 & 
Supp. 2009)) all have explicit statutory provisions regarding the right of publicity. See 
MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3 nn.8–9. 
 27 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3.  Indiana (IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (2002 & Supp. 
2009)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (West 1999 & Supp. 2009)), 
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remaining eleven states have recognized that a common law right 
of publicity exists, although there is no corresponding statute.28 
1. The Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy has a colorful history in the United States, 
perhaps in part because the things that people most often want to 
keep private are things that are scandalous or otherwise interesting 
to the public.  Courts did not recognize a common law right to 
privacy until about 100 years ago,29 when Louis Brandeis, prior to 
his tenure as a justice of the Supreme Court, and his close friend, 
prominent Boston attorney Samuel D. Warren, published a seminal 
article in the Harvard Law Review titled The Right to Privacy.30  
This article advocated legal protection of “the privacy of private 
life,” particularly from newspaper articles detailing private affairs 
and other “flagrant breaches of decency and propriety.”31 The 
authors noted the growth of legal rights that protected property, the 
tangible as well as the intangible.32  Noting a judicial trend 
 
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 211, 25-840.01 (2009)), Nevada (NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 597.790 (2004)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 
2009)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839.1 (2002 & Supp. 2010)), Rhode Island 
(R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1997 & Supp. 2008)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-
1101 to 1108 (West 2001)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2009)), and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010)) 
have privacy statutes that correspond similarly to the elements of the right of publicity. 
 28 Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Utah, and Wisconsin all recognize a common law right of publicity. See MCCARTHY, 
supra note 18, § 6:3 & nn.18–35 (listing several cases in each state that acknowledge a 
common law right of publicity).  Several states that have statutorily defined the right of 
publicity have also found that the right of publicity exists in the common law (e.g., 
California and Illinois). See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:3 n.25. 
 29 See E. Leonard Rubin, Rights of Publicity and Entertainment Licensing, 950 PLI/Pat 
159, 163 (2008) (“There was no common law right of privacy prior to the publication of 
the Warren-Brandeis article, which has been labeled by some as the most influential law 
review article ever published.”). 
 30 Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 31 Id. at 215–16.  “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops.’” Id. at 195. 
 32 Id. at 194. 
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recognizing the existence of a “right to be let alone,” Brandeis and 
Warren also noted that there was a sentiment “long keenly felt” by 
the general public that the law should afford a remedy against “the 
evil of invasion of privacy by the newspapers.”33  Although they 
relied heavily on the concepts of propriety and decency in 
encouraging the development of this right of privacy, Brandeis and 
Warren also reflected on the existing torts of libel and slander, 
finding them insufficient to protect against the exact wrongs 
committed when privacy was destroyed by intrusive newspapers.34  
Emphasizing the importance of allowing an individual to 
determine his own thoughts or feelings (as evidenced by the 
proprietary rights granted when an author pens a poem, for 
example), the authors found that these so-called property rights in 
fact encapsulated key privacy interests.35  However, they did not 
find that the right to privacy was absolute.36  Instead, they felt that 
“the right to privacy [should] not prohibit any publication of matter 
which is of public or general interest.”37  Courts recognizing a right 
of publicity would allow plaintiffs to seek damages, including 
“substantial compensation . . . for injury to feelings,” and in a 
limited number of cases, injunctive relief.38  The article, both by 
recognizing a growing trend in courts nationwide (and worldwide) 
and by emphasizing public sentiment toward invasive press, struck 
a chord with the legal community after its publication. 
In the decades following the article’s publication, courts across 
the country picked up on Brandeis’s and Warren’s ideas, and most 
acknowledged a common law right of privacy.39  For example, a 
scant five years after the article was published, a New York court 
 
 33 Id. at 195. 
 34 See id. at 197. 
 35 See id. at 190–200, 213. 
 36 See id. at 214. 
 37 Id.  The authors noted that there were certainly “difficulties in applying such a rule,” 
but that courts would be able to discern the instances of matters of public interest, 
particularly in instances where the individual seeking privacy had already made his 
affairs public (e.g., an elected official who had, by dint of his position, already thrust 
himself into the limelight). Id. at 214–15. 
 38 Id. at 219. 
 39 See, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 959 (D. Minn. 
1948); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74, 79 (Ga. 1905); Schuyler v. 
Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25–26 (N.Y. 1895). 
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recognized the existence of a legal right to privacy in Schuyler v. 
Curtis.40  In Schuyler, the relatives and friends of a deceased 
woman sued a charitable organization, the Women’s Memorial 
Fund (of which the deceased was a founder), for displaying a bust 
of the dead woman, as well as circulating pamphlets with 
information about her.41  The court noted at the outset that the right 
of privacy was a nascent one, a right whose “boundaries [were not] 
very well recognized or plainly laid down.”42  The relatives alleged 
that she was a private woman who would have disliked this 
attention, but the court was “unimpressed” by the claim, and found 
that any claim of a right to privacy had died with the woman.43 
A decade later, courts still grappled with the intricacies of the 
ill-defined right to privacy.  In a Georgia case, Pavesich v. New 
England Life Insurance Co.,44 a life insurance company in Atlanta, 
Georgia, used a picture of resident Paolo Pavesich to depict a 
satisfied customer of their life insurance policy—despite the fact 
that he had not posed for the photograph and was not even a 
customer of the company.45  The court analyzed the cases studied 
in the Brandeis and Warren article, as well as cases that had 
occurred in the fifteen years since its publication, before 
concluding that a right to privacy existed (or should exist) in 
Georgia.46  The court was “[s]o thoroughly satisfied” by the 
existence of the right of privacy that it “venture[d] to predict that 
the day will come when the American bar will marvel that a 
contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and 
ability.”47 
Despite these inroads, development of the right of privacy was 
not instantaneous, and courts nationwide continued to develop it 
for several decades.  For example, in Minnesota, the Minneapolis 
Star and Tribune Company published a newspaper called The 
Times: The Picture Newspaper, and in an issue ran a picture of 
 
 40 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895). 
 41 Id. at 25. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 45 Id. at 69. 
 46 See id. at 74–79. 
 47 Id. at 80–81. 
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local resident Carl Berg, taken when he was in a courtroom.48  
Berg allegedly protested greatly at the time the picture was taken, 
and filed suit, alleging a violation of his right to privacy.49  The 
court recognized Brandeis’s and Warren’s article, but emphasized 
the exception in cases of public interest.50  It noted that since 
“pioneer days,” there had been clear public interest in courtroom 
proceedings, and that the photograph was therefore a matter of 
public interest and not subject to the right of privacy.51 
Eighty-six years after the publication of The Right to Privacy, 
Dean William Prosser enumerated this growing trend of 
recognizing privacy rights in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.52  
The Restatement identified four separate rights of action relating to 
privacy: (1) “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another;” (2) “appropriation of the other’s name or likeness;” (3) 
“unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life;” and (4) 
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before 
the public.”53  Courts later used these four torts to distinguish 
different types of privacy claims.54  By its language alone, 
Prosser’s fourth tort seems to lend itself best to applications to 
claims of violation of the right of publicity. 
a) Evolution of Privacy Law to Publicity Law 
The common law right to privacy is now recognized in the vast 
majority of jurisdictions.55  In some states, the right to privacy has 
 
 48 Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 957 (D. Minn. 1948). 
 49 Id. at 958. 
 50 See id. at 959–60. 
 51 See id. at 960. 
 52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. c (1977). 
 53 Id. § 652A. 
 54 See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 229–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing 
the four torts and the application of the First Amendment); Cordell v. Detective Publ’ns, 
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (discussing unreasonable publicity given 
to private life); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213–14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1961) (same). 
 55 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A app., reporter’s note (noting that, as 
of the mid-1970s, privacy rights were recognized under the common law of thirty-six 
states and expressly rejected in only three); see also Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 
N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998) (stating that only Wyoming, Minnesota and North Dakota 
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been broadly construed and used to cover claims that would 
otherwise be brought under a right of publicity claim in other 
states.56  For example, a case in Hawaii featured the typical 
elements of a right of publicity claim: the defendant, a real estate 
company, used pictures of the plaintiffs and their home, as well as 
their names, “in sales brochures, in advertisements in publications, 
and in television commercials” without their permission.57  The 
court found that the defendant had “appropriated the plaintiffs’ 
name and personality for its own benefit in advertising,” but found 
that plaintiffs had stated a claim for invasion of the right of 
privacy, not publicity.58  This court was neither the first nor the last 
to attempt to disentangle the two doctrines, and this case is an 
example of how easily both courts and parties can mistake these 
doctrines. 
However, as more and more jurisdictions adopt either statutory 
or common law rights of publicity, courts rely less frequently on 
the right of privacy to cover the concept.59  The right of publicity 
can include aspects of some or all of Prosser’s four torts, 
depending on the wording and construction of the statute or the 
interpretation of the underlying common law.  In describing a 
cause of action for a violation of the right of publicity, a California 
court noted that “[i]n such an action a plaintiff does not rely upon 
the inaccuracy of the content of an article; instead, he charges that 
even if accurate the publication of the facts interferes with his 
‘right to be let alone.’”60  This description is more or less an 
amalgamation of Prosser’s first (“unreasonable intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another”) and third (“unreasonable publicity given to 
the other’s private life”) torts.61  Courts have crafted an 
 
have failed to recognize any of Prosser’s four torts, and only Nebraska and New York 
have expressly declined to recognize a common law right to privacy). 
 56 See, e.g., Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 142 (Haw. 
1968). 
 57 See id. at 142. 
 58 Id. at 144. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010) (stating that a violation of 
the right of publicity requires that the defendant misappropriate the plaintiff’s image, 
name, etc., for his own commercial benefit). 
 59 See infra Part I.B. 
 60 Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1969) (quoting Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 
91, 92 (Cal. App. Dist. 1931)). 
 61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
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approximation of the right of publicity out of its tangled privacy 
roots, but have also turned to its property aspects to develop the 
nuances of the right of publicity. 
2. Intellectual Property Rights 
Unlike the privacy right aspect of the right of publicity, which 
focuses on repairing mental anguish caused by the unauthorized 
“publicity,”62 the property right aspect allows a plaintiff to control 
(and profit from) the commercial use of his or her image.63  
Intellectual property rights are largely in the domain of the federal 
government; some, such as patents, have never been under state 
control, whereas others, such as trademarks, have only recently 
shifted to a uniform system of federal control.64 
a) Copyrights and Patents 
Copyrights and patents have a unique role in the federal regime 
of intellectual property, as they are the only categories of 
intellectual property mentioned directly by the Constitution.65  The 
Constitution secures to the federal government the right “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”66 This clause has been so 
long established as acknowledging protection of what we now 
know as copyrights and patents that it has been given the moniker 
“the Copyright clause.”67  Although the founders clearly 
recognized the importance of both copyrights and patents, they 
could not anticipate every creation (or “discovery”) that would 
need to be protected, and the protective spheres of copyright and 
patent have been expanded over time. 
 
 62 See id. § 652H(b) cmt. b. 
 63 See id. § 652C cmt. a. 
 64 This section serves as a brief overview of several important intellectual property 
categories, but does not purport to cover a detailed history of each. 
 65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See, e.g., HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3 (2008) (referring to 
the clause as both the “Copyright-Patent clause” and the “Copyright clause”). 
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The Copyright Act abolished all complementary state laws on 
the subject in 1976.68  More recent incarnations of the statute have 
widened the scope of the Act to include everything from literary 
works such as poems and novels (as anticipated by the founding 
fathers) to technological innovations such as sound recordings and 
semiconductor chips (probably not as predictable at the time of the 
drafting of the Constitution).69 
Patents have an entire title of the United States Code devoted 
to their intricacies.70  Patents protect novel inventions, from 
methods of making chemicals71 to useful (or even not-so-useful) 
objects.72  The first Patent Act was issued almost 220 years ago, 
demonstrating a long history of federal control over this venerable 
intellectual property right.73  However, the application of patents to 
the field of the right of publicity is somewhat limited; trademarks 
may in some ways provide a closer analogy. 
b) Trademarks and the Lanham Act 
The history of trademarks conflicts notably with the 
straightforward trajectory of copyrights and patents.  Trademarks 
were traditionally protected by the common law of each state,74 
and trademark owners claiming a misappropriation of their 
trademark had to rely on the tort of unfair competition.75  
Trademarks were not federally protected until 1870,76 and even 
 
 68 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 69 See 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 70 Title 35 of the United States Code is appropriately and succinctly titled “Patents.” 35 
U.S.C. Refs. & Annots. (2006). 
 71 See Henry Paynter, The First Patent, INVENTION & TECH., Fall 1990, at 19, 21 
(describing the first patent ever issued in the United States, for a process of refining ash 
for use in soaps and other items). 
 72 See, e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Obscure Patent of the Week: The Dog Umbrella and 
Leash, IPWATCHDOG.COM, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/op_dog_umbrella 
.html (describing a patent for a combination pet leash and dog umbrella). 
 73 For an interesting description of the history of the Patent Acts, and the first patent 
ever issued, see Mary Bellis, The 212th Anniversary of the First American Patent Act, 
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa073100a.htm. 
 74 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879). 
 75 See generally Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism 
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1800 (2007) (stating that trademark law 
“emerged from the common law tort of unfair competition”). 
 76 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92. 
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this first attempt at legislating universal protection of trademarks 
was invalidated by the Supreme Court less than a decade later, in 
1879.77  In the Trade-Mark Cases,78 the Court found that the Act 
was unconstitutional, as Congress’s powers to regulate trademarks 
were limited to those powers provided by the Commerce Clause.79  
Throughout the next seventy years, more legislation was passed.80  
Some proposals were more effective than others, but the general 
confusion surrounding these pieces of legislation led to the 
creation of the Lanham Act.81 
The Lanham Act prevents, among other things, false 
endorsement—it forbids the use of “any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” when doing so 
would confuse (intentionally or otherwise) a consumer of the 
product into thinking that the product was endorsed by or 
sponsored by someone who is, in actuality, not affiliated with the 
product.82  The Lanham Act was crafted by Congress largely to 
deal with unfair competition and trademark infringement on a 
federal level, when they had previously been addressed by states 
alone.83  However, Congress also drafted the Act to modernize 
state law to address business practices of the day, which had 
changed greatly since the inception of the common law: “one of 
the principal purposes of the 1946 revisions of the Lanham Act 
was ‘(t)o modernize the trade-mark statutes so that they will 
conform to legitimate present-day business practice.’”84 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can sometimes serve as an 
“appropriate vehicle for the assertion of claims of falsely implying 
 
 77 See id. at 92–96. 
78  100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879). 
 79 Id. at 96. 
 80 See Law of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724; Law of March 3, 1881, ch. 
138, 21 Stat. 502. 
 81 See Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for 
Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner of a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 893, 933–37 (2008). 
 82 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 83 See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(“The Act’s purpose . . . is exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial 
class against unscrupulous commercial conduct.” (citation omitted)). 
 84 Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276). 
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the endorsement of a product or service by a real person.”85  Use of 
a celebrity’s image could confuse consumers as to whether or not a 
celebrity endorsed a particular product.86  However, the Lanham 
Act’s provisions regarding false advertising may not be applicable 
to publications that inform or entertain (such as tabloid 
magazines). 
3. Development of Intellectual Property and the Right of 
Publicity 
Just as intellectual property rights recognize the time and effort 
that a creator expends when developing a new invention or 
composing a piece of music, and reward the inventor with a 
pecuniary benefit, the right of publicity recognizes that a celebrity 
should enjoy certain benefits when he or she expends time and 
effort to establish his or her celebrity “status,” name recognition, 
and general desirability.  Courts have slowly begun to recognize 
the link between traditional forms of intellectual property and the 
hybridized form found in the right of publicity.87  Although the 
right of publicity has its roots in the right of privacy, its valuable 
intellectual property aspects helped it expand nationwide.88  Judge 
Jerome Frank in Haelan wryly noted that the right of publicity was 
of such great concern to celebrities not because of fears of “having 
their feelings bruised through public exposure,” but because they 
“would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money” for 
 
 85 Albert v. Apex Fitness, No. 97 Civ. 1151, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8535, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1997) (quoting 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:15 (4th ed. 1996)). 
 86 See, e.g., Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that 
defendants’ representation of the plaintiff in advertising might mislead consumers into 
believing that plaintiff had endorsed the product). 
 87 “[S]ince the celebrity spends time, money, and energy in developing a commercially 
lucrative persona, that persona is the fruit of the celebrity’s labor and entitles her to its 
reward.” Sudakshina Sen, Comment, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right 
of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739, 740 (1995) (discussing modern applications of 
philosopher John Locke’s theory that a person has a property right in their own person 
and in the work they produce). 
 88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995); Alain J. 
Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford A 
Global Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 247–50 
(2007). 
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use of their image.89  Nonetheless, the court in that instance found 
that whether or not the right of publicity was categorized as a 
property right was “immaterial,” as the label “simply symbolizes 
the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.”90 
a) Incorporation into the Right of Publicity 
Most right of publicity statutes require that the use of the 
person’s name, image, or other “publicity” aspect be for trade or 
advertising purposes;91 that is, that the violator is making money or 
otherwise earning a benefit through unauthorized use of the 
plaintiff’s image.  In this sense, the right of publicity incorporates 
aspects of a personal property right and allows for recovery of 
damages.  For example, California law awards plaintiffs “the 
greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages 
suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of the unauthorized use, and any 
profits from the unauthorized use.”92  New York likewise allows 
plaintiffs to “sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by 
reason of such use,” and also permits “exemplary damages” at the 
discretion of the jury.93  These economic damages mimic the 
underlying purposes of intellectual property rights and separate the 
right of publicity from the right of privacy, which focuses more on 
protection of feelings of embarrassment or other emotional 
injuries. 
B. The Right of Publicity in the Common Law and Statutory 
Forms 
1. Common Law Rise of the Right of Publicity 
Several states (though by no means a majority) recognize a 
common law right of publicity.94  This change has taken place over 
time, spurred in part by Brandeis’s and Warren’s article and the 
resulting court reactions, as well as by the growth of various forms 
 
 89 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Lapter, supra note 88, at 273. 
 92 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2010). 
 93 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009). 
 94 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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of media, from the radio to the Internet.  Some states, such as 
Pennsylvania, have recognized this common law right of publicity 
by distinguishing it from similar rights, such as the general right of 
privacy or the more specific tort of misappropriation of 
commercial identity.95 
Other states have recognized the right of publicity because of 
the growing trend of nationwide recognition and the necessity of 
protecting the interests at stake.96  Arizona is one such example.  In 
2007, a federal court reviewing Arizona law noted that “[i]t seems 
clear to this Court that a celebrity’s interest in his name and 
likeness is unequaled and has been recognized as such by more 
than half the states in this country,” and found “no reason why a 
claim for invasion of the right of publicity should not be 
recognized in Arizona.”97  On the East Coast, a federal court 
applying Connecticut law also saw “no reason” to “buck the 
apparent trend in the law towards recognizing the right of 
publicity.”98 
Only one state has explicitly denied a common law right of 
publicity.99  New York has denied both a common law right to 
privacy as well as of publicity, and all claims for a violation of 
either right must instead be brought under its statutory 
provisions.100  This denial of a common law right to privacy was 
made over one hundred years ago, when New York’s highest court 
found that “the so-called ‘right of privacy’ has not as yet found an 
abiding place in our jurisprudence, and . . . the doctrine cannot now 
be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of 
 
 95 A Pennsylvania court noted recently “that although similar, the right of publicity is 
not identical to invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness.”  Rose v. Triple 
Crown Nutrition, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-00056, 2007 WL 707348, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 
2007). 
 96 See Pooley v. Nat’l Hole-In-One Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111–12 (D. Ariz. 
2000) (discussing states that have recognized a right of publicity and why they have done 
so); Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).  
 97 Pooley, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
 98 Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 867 F. Supp. at 189.  Yes, even Muppets have a right of 
publicity (or at least their creators can enforce it). See id. 
 99 See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902).  
This case still serves as the standard of recognition for disavowal of a common law right. 
 100 See Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984). 
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law.”101  The New York Court of Appeals has subsequently used 
the fact that a common law right of privacy does not exist in New 
York to hold that a common law right of publicity does not exist 
either.102  The court held that “[s]ince the ‘right of publicity’ is 
encompassed under the [New York] Civil Rights Law [section 50] 
as an aspect of the right of privacy, which . . . is exclusively 
statutory in this State, [a] plaintiff cannot claim an independent 
common-law right of publicity.”103  Though New York is alone in 
its explicit denial of this common law right, the difference between 
the New York action for a violation of the right of publicity (i.e., a 
recovery only under statute) and that of other states is more or less 
a technical difference. 
The development of the common law right is illustrated by a 
number of cases across the United States.  In Clark v. Celeb 
Publishing, Inc.,104 Lynda Clark, a model, sued Celeb Magazine, 
an apparently low-brow and “very explicit” pornographic 
publication, under the California common law right of publicity 
when the magazine used her photograph without permission in an 
advertisement within the magazine.105  A photograph of the 
plaintiff taking her pants off appeared on both the front and back 
covers of the magazine, as well as in an advertisement inside, 
bizarrely encouraging readers to “[t]ake off [their] pants and 
subscribe to Celeb.”106  Clark claimed a number of emotional 
problems resulting from this unauthorized appearance, as well as 
an invasion of her privacy and a misappropriation of her 
commercial identity (i.e., a violation of her right of publicity).107  
The court awarded Clark economic damages to compensate for the 
economic injury suffered due to the misuse of her image in a 
commercial context.108  The court noted that “considerable money, 
 
 101 Roberson, 64 N.E. at 447. 
 102 See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584. 
 103 Id. 
 104 530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 105 Id. at 981.  Although the court does not describe the reputation of the publication in 
depth, it does reference plaintiff’s claim that gentlemen’s magazines such as Penthouse 
(not particularly renowned for its classiness) wanted “nothing more to do with her” after 
her appearance in Celeb Magazine. Id. at 982. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 983. 
 108 Id. at 983–84. 
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time and energy” must be expended to “create considerable 
commercial value in one’s identity” and that this self-created value 
should be protected by the courts.109  Ms. Clark was able to recover 
damages, both compensatory and punitive, from the magazine110 
without invoking the complementary statutory protection in 
California.111 
In a more recent case in Minnesota, wrestler (not yet Governor) 
Jesse Ventura brought charges against the wrestling organization, 
the World Wrestling Federation (“WWF,” now “World Wrestling 
Entertainment”), for distributing videotapes featuring his image 
and commentary, alleging that the WWF had been unjustly 
enriched by misappropriating his right of publicity.112  The federal 
court found that Minnesota would recognize a common law tort of 
the right of publicity, despite the fact that the state does not 
explicitly recognize Prosser’s four torts of privacy.113  In 
distinguishing the right of publicity from the right of privacy, the 
court noted that “[t]he right to publicity protects pecuniary, not 
emotional, interests.”114  Thus, the court reasoned, the wrestling 
organization’s profit from Ventura’s name and image, without his 
consent, violated this right, even though Minnesota did not 
recognize any of Prosser’s four torts.115 
The recognition of a common law right to publicity continues 
to surface in recent cases,116 despite the rise of state statutes 
covering the right.117  Even an homage to a celebrity, meant to be 
flattering, can trigger a claim for misappropriation of this right.118  
In Missouri, a Canadian hockey player, Tony Twist, sued comic 
 
 109 Id. at 984 n.2. 
 110 Id. at 984–85. 
 111 See id.; see also infra Part I.B.3.a (discussing the statutory right). 
 112 Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 725 (8th Cir. 1995).  Ventura became 
Governor of Minnesota three years later. See Pam Belluck, A ‘Bad Boy’ Wrestler’s 
Unscripted Upset, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/1998/11/05/us/the-1998-elections-the-states-the-maverick-a-bad-boy-wrestler-sunscr 
ipted-upset.html. 
 113 Ventura, 65 F.3d at 730. 
 114 Id. (citing Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280–81 (D. Minn. 1970)). 
 115 See id. 
 116 See, e.g., supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra Part I.B.3. 
 118 E.g., Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
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book author Seth McFarlane for giving an evil mafia boss 
character the same name.119  Although McFarlane was “a self-
proclaimed hockey fanatic” who openly admitted that he had 
deliberately named the villain after the plaintiff, the court found 
that the defendant had “used Twist’s name and identity to gain a 
commercial advantage.”120  The court found that the commercial 
value of the plaintiff’s name outweighed the artistic license (and 
perhaps fan worship) of the defendant, and awarded the plaintiff 
$15 million for the misappropriation.121 
2. Overlap Between Common Law and Statutes 
Unlike New York, several states that recognize a common law 
right of publicity also have a statute in place protecting the same or 
similar interests.122  Despite their similarities, the statutory and 
common law rights sometimes differ in the outcome or allowed 
recovery.123  In California, for example, a plaintiff relying on the 
common law right of publicity must prove: “(1) the defendant’s 
use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s 
name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or 
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.”124  
California courts have acknowledged that the common law right of 
publicity protects slightly different (although substantively similar) 
interests than those that are protected by the statute.125  In reality, 
however, the difference between statutory rights of publicity and 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 59–60. 
 121 See id. at 52, 57–58. 
 122 See infra Part I.B.3. 
 123 See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (noting that the California statute “requires a ‘knowing’ use [of a plaintiff’s name, 
photograph or likeness] whereas under case law, mistake and inadvertence are not a 
defense against commercial appropriation,” which a plaintiff may not be able to prove). 
 124 Id. (basing the required elements of California’s common law right of publicity on 
those of Prosser’s fourth tort, the tort of publicity that unreasonably places another in a 
false light before the public); see also supra text accompanying note 53. 
 125 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 
protections afforded by the California common law right of publicity are much broader 
than those available under its statutory complement); see also Michaels v. Internet Entm’t 
Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“This distinction [between statute and 
common law] is important because the common law right protects a broader range of 
interests against a broader range of infringing conduct than does the statutory right.”). 
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those granted by the common law are mostly a technical 
difference, rather than one with meaningfully and discernibly 
different outcomes. 
3. Statutory Rights of Publicity 
State statutes protecting the right of publicity can complement 
the common law right of publicity, or they can subsume it entirely.  
The statutes vary greatly in wording and scope.  Development of 
statutory protections has taken place over the last 100 years; each 
statute represents specific demands on its individual state 
legislatures brought by constituents, courts, or even celebrities.126  
New York was the first state to draft a statute protecting the right 
of privacy (including language that would be expanded by later 
courts to include the misappropriation of the right of publicity).127  
While some states, such as Utah128 and Virginia,129 enacted statutes 
modeled after New York’s a few years later after its drafting, other 
states developed their own statutes to be deliberately distinct from 
the New York statute.130  One such state that does not adhere to the 
elements of the New York statute is California.  The two states are 
perhaps the most interesting in regards to the right of publicity due 
to their unique positions: California serves as undoubtedly the state 
most populated by celebrities and thus as the pioneer of many 
developments of the right of publicity, and New York represents 
both a cultural center that attracts many celebrities as well as the 
home of many publications.  Moreover, both states incorporate a 
“newsworthiness” exception that speaks directly to the line drawn 
between the rights of celebrities and the rights of the public.131 
 
 126 Tennessee, for example, was prompted to draft its right of publicity to protect one of 
its most valuable (deceased) denizens: Elvis Presley. See Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, 
But He Shouldn’t Be: The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 600–03. 
 127 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009); MCCARTHY, supra note 18, 
§ 6:72. 
 128 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-1 to 6 (West 2009). 
 129 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009). 
 130 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010). 
 131 See id. § 3344(d); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“In 
this regard it is the established law of New York that the unauthorized use of an 
individual’s picture is not for a ‘trade purpose’, and thus not violative of s 51, if it is ‘in 
connection with an item of news or one that is newsworthy.’” (quoting Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952) (citations omitted)). 
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a) California 
The statutory provision supplementing the common law right 
of publicity in California is commonly known as the “Celebrity 
Rights Act.”132  It protects the “name, voice, signature, photograph, 
or likeness” of any person (not just a celebrity, despite the title of 
the act) when any of the aforementioned are used without 
permission, “for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting 
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods[,] or services.”133  The 
post-mortem provision of section 3344.1 extends protection of the 
right of publicity an additional seventy years after the death of the 
celebrity in question, allowing the inheritors of the right of 
publicity to continue to protect the celebrity’s image after his death 
(the so-called “Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act”).134 
One expects the case reporters of California, the most populous 
state (and, according to McCarthy, the most litigious),135 as well as 
the home of Hollywood and its pantheon of celebrities, to be 
overflowing with decisions concerning the right of publicity.136  
This is not so.  For any number of reasons—settlement before an 
ultimate adjudication, lack of interest in including these cases in 
the reporters, or other factors—the number of cases reported pales 
in comparison to those reported in other states, such as New 
York.137 
Nonetheless, numerous cases of angry celebrities versus defiant 
magazines, promoters, and advertisers have made it to the pages of 
the reporters.  Eastwood v. Superior Court138 exemplifies a case 
typically brought under the statutory provision governing the right 
of publicity.139  Actor Clint Eastwood sued The National Enquirer 
 
 132 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344. 
 133 Id. § 3344(a). 
 134 The statute overrules previous California case law, which had held that the 
protection of publicity rights did not extend past the celebrity’s death. See Lugosi v. 
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979).  The right of publicity is now a 
devisable and descendible right. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 
215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 135 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:11. 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 139 See id. at 344. 
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for publishing a 600-word article about a purported love triangle in 
which he was involved, including pictures of himself and one of 
the women placed on the cover of the tabloid.140  To satisfy the 
requirements of the statute, Eastwood was required to plead that 
the defendants knowingly used his name and image without his 
consent for commercial profit.141  Because he failed to do so, his 
claim failed on statutory grounds.142 
California recognizes an exception to the statutory protection 
granted by section 3344: uses of the image that are considered 
“newsworthy” do not violate the statute.143  Although California 
courts have tended to apply the newsworthiness exception 
broadly,144 they have failed to define “newsworthy” specifically.  It 
is unclear whether this protection applies to most tabloid-style 
articles or pictorials, due to their tendency to stretch the truth for 
the sake of sales, because “[e]ven though the [newsworthiness] 
exceptions are to be broadly construed, the newsworthiness 
privileges do not apply where a defendant uses a plaintiff’s name 
and likeness in a knowingly false manner to increase sales of the 
publication.”145  This exception to the newsworthiness exception is 
aptly referred to most often as the “knowing falsehood” 
exception.146 
However, in Solano v. Playgirl,147 the court refused to classify 
all tabloids or gossip magazines as publications that fell outside the 
newsworthiness exception, merely because their purpose was to 
entertain or amuse.148  The court found that even “vulgar” 
publications can be classified as news and that news may serve to 
 
 140 Id. at 344–45. 
 141 See id. at 347.  For an in-depth discussion of the facts and holding of the Eastwood 
case, see infra notes 234–40 and accompanying text. 
 142 See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352. 
 143 Section 3344(d) provides that the use of an image, likeness, etc., does not violate the 
statute when the use is “in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast 
or account, or any political campaign.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2010). 
 144 See, e.g., Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 145 Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 146 Id. at 1089 (citations omitted); Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352. 
 147 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 148 See id. at 1089 n.8. 
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entertain or amuse as well as to inform.149  Without the 
newsworthiness exception, there might be no protection of First 
Amendment concerns or a free press; its existence limits the 
otherwise broad protections of the right of publicity in California 
and prevents those seeking to enforce their publicity or privacy 
rights from running roughshod over the interests of the public. 
b) New York 
New York has never recognized a common law right to 
publicity, and instead, plaintiffs must rely entirely on sections 50 
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Laws to protect their 
publicity and their privacy rights.150  These laws prohibit the 
nonconsensual misuse of a plaintiff’s “name, portrait, picture or 
voice . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.”151  
As in California, this cause of action allows for recovery in the 
form of both appropriate damages and injunctive relief.152 
The “misuse” must be for trade or advertising purposes;153 this 
is a narrowly-construed categorization, crafted by the legislature to 
“[strike] a balance” between the concerns of private individuals 
and the First Amendment concerns that encourage “free speech 
and a free press,” particularly in regards to events that are of 
 
 149 See id.  For a full discussion of the case, see infra notes 227–32 and accompanying 
text. 
 150 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.  One of the major problems with 
the right of publicity, as opposed to the right of privacy, is that it remains a valuable right 
after a person’s death and thus can be exploited by heirs and assignees.  It no longer 
retains the individuality and privacy concerns that exist while the person is alive.  
However, in New York, neither the right of privacy nor the right of publicity has been 
recognized as extending post-mortem. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 6:81.  
Legislation has been introduced several times over the last twenty years in attempts to 
grant post-mortem rights to the heirs or successors of the deceased, but has failed to 
become law.  The most recent attempt to extend the rights of publicity after death was 
introduced in 2007, but has yet to make progress in the New York State Senate. See, e.g., 
2009–2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5066.  Opponents of the bill express concern that the bill, as 
drafted, would be unconstitutional, would impermissibly restrict freedom of the press, 
and would be difficult to implement in practice. See NYC BAR ASS’N, REPORT 
EXPRESSION OPPOSITION TO A.8836/S.6005 (2009), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ 
pdf/report/Dead_Celebrities.pdf. 
 151 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009). 
 152 See id. § 51. 
 153 See id. 
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general noteworthiness.154  It does not include “incidental” uses of 
a plaintiff’s name, likeness, etc.155  Judges have particularly 
explored the boundaries of the words “portrait” and “picture;” 
although it is “settled that ‘any recognizable likeness, not just an 
actual photograph, may qualify as a ‘portrait or picture,’’” the 
words are still interpreted on a case-by-case basis.156 
Like California, New York also recognizes a newsworthiness 
exception to the right of publicity statute (although it is not 
codified, as it is in California),157 which allows publications to use 
celebrities’ names and likenesses without their consent when the 
matter is one of public interest.158  “New York courts early 
recognized the need to encourage the free exchange of ideas” when 
reviewing claims for an invasion of privacy or a misappropriation 
of the right of publicity, and they thus “created a broad privilege 
for the legitimate dissemination to the public of news and 
information.”159  Although the exception is not statutorily 
conferred, it is as broadly recognized as it is broadly construed.160 
Adding to the ambiguity of this uncodified exception is the 
existence of certain exceptions to the newsworthiness exception.161  
One such exception-to-the-exception is the reasonable relation 
requirement, articulated in Finger v. Omni Publications 
International.162  This exception applies to pictures that 
 
 154 D’Andrea v. Rafla-Demetrious, 972 F. Supp. 154, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting 
Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982)).  This concern also 
speaks to the newsworthiness exception. See infra notes 158–67 and accompanying text. 
 155 Id. at 157. “In other words, ‘isolated’ or ‘fleeting and incidental’ uses of a person’s 
name or image, even if unauthorized, are insufficient to establish an invasion of privacy 
claim.” Id. (quoting Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 
256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 304 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)). 
 156 See, e.g., Burck v. Mars, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting 
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (considering different 
possible interpretations for a picture or a portrait in various cases). 
 157 See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 158 See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 159 Id. at 131. 
 160 See, e.g., Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, 566 N.E.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 1990) (“Although 
the statute does not define ‘purposes of trade’ or ‘advertising,’ courts have consistently 
refused to construe these terms as encompassing publications concerning newsworthy 
events or matters of public interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 161 See id. at 144. 
 162 566 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990). 
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accompany an article that is a matter of public interest; if the 
picture has no “real relationship” to the article or the article is an 
advertisement in disguise, then the right of publicity statute 
applies.163  The real relation exception is less protective than it 
seems—in Finger, the court held that there could be a real relation 
between an article about in vitro fertilization and other techniques, 
such as “caffeine-spritzed sperm,” and an image of the defendant’s 
family of six children (none of whom were conceived through in 
vitro fertilization or caffeinated sperm).164  The court therefore 
found that an article generally about fertility and an image of a 
family that was probably fairly fertile were adequately related.165 
Additionally, the newsworthiness exception does not apply 
when “the defendant’s use was infected with material and 
substantial fiction or falsity.”166  However, a simple factual or 
research error will not suffice; instead, the defendant must have 
acted with “some degree of fault” or otherwise have known in 
some way that the misuse was false.167  This exception is similar to 
that of California’s knowing falsehood exception.168  The knowing 
falsehood exception is the most useful to celebrities seeking to 
vindicate their rights in light of an obviously exaggerated or 
untruthful tabloid article. 
C. Tabloids 
1. History 
Tabloids serve many purposes.169  To reputable newspapers, 
they represent the scourge of the publishing industry; to celebrities, 
they serve as a harbinger of bad publicity; to the supermarket-
going public, they are a guilty pleasure glanced at surreptitiously 
while waiting in the checkout line.  Named after a condensed pill 
 
 163 Id. at 143 (quoting Murray v. N.Y. Magazine Co., 267 N.E.2d 256, 258 (N.Y. 
1971)). 
 164 See id. at 143. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 167 Id. 
 168 See id.; see also Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 169 Excluding liner for bird cages. 
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popular in pharmacies at the turn of the century,170 the category of 
“tabloid journalism” is both a genre involving scandalous, not-
always-true, vapid news stories, and an epithet denoting the lowest 
form of journalism.  In the 1960s, these broadsheet papers turned 
their focus from alien abductions to the foibles of the celebrity 
world, latching on to the nuances of Jackie Kennedy’s marriage to 
Aristotle Onassis or the death of Elvis Presley.171  Throughout the 
last fifty years, tabloid circulation and popularity has ebbed and 
flowed, but a number of changes have invigorated the industry.  
Some are simple: Star Magazine, once relegated to the racks 
behind the conveyer belt at the supermarket checkout with the 
other tabloids, has since been moved to the ranks of long-running 
women’s magazines like Cosmopolitan or Vogue, due to its new 
glossy format.172  Other changes are more complicated, arising 
from advancing technology, such as the popularity of celebrity 
gossip websites, which can report news—or, more likely, 
rumors—faster than a traditional print medium.173 
2. Celebrity Culture 
Whether tabloids ignited American fascination with celebrities 
or simply recognized this fascination and profited from it, this 
phenomenon has not gone unrecognized by legal scholars: 
 
 170 See T.F. HOAD, Tabloid, in THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 
ETYMOLOGY (1996), available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O27-tabloid.html. 
 171 Kate Pickert, A Brief History of: Tabloids!!, TIME, Aug. 25, 2008, at 18, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1832868,00.html.  Pickert notes that 
The National Enquirer paid a relative of Elvis Presley to photograph him in his coffin, 
attesting to the incredible lengths tabloids will go to for the exclusive inside celebrity 
scoop. Id. 
 172 See id.  Star switched from a broadsheet, newsprint format to a glossy, magazine-
like format in 2004. Id. 
 173 For a sampling of celebrity gossip websites written in different “voices,” ranging 
from the gossipy insider to the macho chauvinist, see, e.g., D-Listed, http://www. 
dlisted.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Oh No They Didn’t (ONTD), http://www.live 
journal.com/community/ohnotheydidnt (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Perez Hilton, http:// 
www.perezhilton.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); What Would Tyler Durden Do?, 
http://www.wwtdd.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).  The eponymous author of the Perez 
Hilton blog has parlayed his inside knowledge of the celebrity sphere into numerous 
guest-hosting spots at popular bars and clubs, and even a television special on VH1. 
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A good deal of coverage in the media devoted to 
celebrities seems to delight in the misfortunes of 
prominent people.  The Germans have a word for 
the human impulse to take pleasure in the 
misfortunes of others: Schadenfreude.  “Seeing such 
rich, arrogant people brought down to earth is for 
many deeply satisfying.”174 
However, the increasing attention paid to celebrities has 
engendered a backlash of lawsuits filed by the celebrities, in 
attempts to protect their privacy, their good name, or at least 
recoup some of the revenue earned by the tabloids when an image 
of the celebrity (and often a shocking headline) is splashed across 
the cover of a tabloid.  Most of these lawsuits proceed on a variety 
of theories and encompass several claims, from infliction of 
emotional distress to the misappropriation of the right of 
publicity.175  For example, when The National Enquirer published 
a fabricated interview with Clint Eastwood about his relationship 
with actress Frances Fisher and his newborn baby,176 he sued the 
tabloid for a host of wrongs: violation of the Lanham Act; invasion 
of his personal privacy; misappropriation of his likeness under 
both statutory and common law grounds; and damage to his 
reputation.177  As seen in this example, the interactions between 
celebrities and tabloids are complex, and outcomes can vary 
widely by state, depending on which causes are recognized either 
statutorily or under the common law, and which exceptions apply. 
II. DIVIDED SCHOLARSHIP—HOW SHOULD THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY EVOLVE? 
This Part of the Note analyzes the divide between scholars and 
courts who advocate a more protective right of publicity and those 
who champion a less protective right of publicity or even propose 
 
 174 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 8:56 & n.4 (quoting Prof. John Portman, quoted in K. 
Breslau, Silicon Valley’s Latest Craze: Schadenfraude, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2000, at 64). 
 175 See Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997), for an example 
of a lawsuit encompassing several theories.  
 176 Id. at 1250.  
 177  Id. 
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to eliminate it entirely.  It illustrates these viewpoints with 
inconsistent outcomes between two major players in the right of 
publicity debates, New York and California.  This Part additionally 
considers “newsworthiness” exceptions that are more or less 
protective and considers their relation to the growth—or decline—
of the right of publicity. 
A. Protecting Celebrities: Arguments in Support of a Strong Right 
of Publicity 
Many commentators view the growth of the right of publicity 
as a work-in-progress and advocate a federal system that 
recognizes the right and expands its protection or encourages more 
states to take a protective stance.178  These scholars espouse the 
growth of the right of publicity for a number of reasons: there is a 
growing trend of states to recognize the right of publicity;179 the 
right of publicity has expanded from privacy or other intellectual 
property roots;180 and celebrities require protection from 
increasingly aggressive and intrusive behavior from paparazzi or 
magazines.181  These scholars often advocate a more stringent 
newsworthiness exception,182 which would eliminate the protection 
for certain uses in publications, while limiting First Amendment 
protections. 
1. More Recognition but Less Uniformity Among States 
Although more states have come to accept a right of publicity 
over the last fifty years, each state’s interpretation of what, exactly, 
constitutes this right can differ sharply.183  The differences in these 
statutes breed a lack of uniformity among forum states, allowing 
 
 178 See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 
49 DUKE L.J. 383, 477 (1999). 
 179 See id. at 394–400. 
 180 See id. at 411–12. 
 181 See generally Keith Willis, Note, Paparazzi, Tabloids, and the New Hollywood 
Press: Can Celebrities Claim a Defensible Publicity Right in Order to Prevent the Media 
from Following Their Every Move?, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 175, 178 (2007) 
(discussing examples of celebrities being hounded by the media). 
 182 See, e.g., id. at 186–92. 
 183 See generally Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of 
Publicity “Wheel” Spun Out of Control, 45 KAN. L. REV. 329 (1997). 
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celebrities to “forum-shop” in order to obtain a favorable result in 
one jurisdiction, where the outcome might not be as favorable in 
another.184  More simply, the lack of uniformity among states, 
particularly with respect to the newsworthiness exception, makes 
right of publicity protection essentially available on a case-by-case 
basis.185  This lack of uniformity differs from other intellectual 
property rights, which often derive their strength from their ability 
to be protected in the same or similar fashion in every jurisdiction 
(and, increasingly, among countries).186  Because of the lack of 
homogeny among cases and statutes, some commentators advocate 
for a stronger federal right of publicity.187 
2. Development Away from Privacy or Property Rights 
Other commentators advocate for a stronger right of publicity 
because they believe it has outgrown its origins in privacy law.188  
At the same time, these commentators note that the right of 
publicity also differs in important respects from property rights.  
Professor Michael Madow articulates this disjunction by noting a 
difference between the right of publicity and other intellectual 
property torts: a celebrity “is not the sole and sovereign ‘author’ of 
what she means for others.”189  This view finds that “celebrity” is 
created not just by the celebrity and her labor, but also by the 
cultural and contextual meaning infused by the media, the 
 
 184 See generally Kevin M. Fisher, Comment, Which Path to Follow: A Comparative 
Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 95 (2000) (noting that the 
benefits of a federal right would reduce the likelihood of forum shopping by celebrities). 
 185 See generally Langvardt, supra note 183 (detailing the host of evils that have 
resulted from conflicting state laws and interpretations of the right of publicity).  
Langvardt also addresses the possibility that celebrities would want to sue in federal court 
and thus tack on a possibly redundant or unnecessary Lanham Act claim to obtain 
jurisdiction. Id. at 355–56. 
 186 See supra Part I.A.2. 
187 See, e.g., Eric J. Goodman, Comment, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a 
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227 (1999); Sean D. 
Whaley, “I’m a Highway Star”: An Outline for a Federal Right of Publicity, 31 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257 (2009). 
 188 See Haemmerli, supra note 178, at 383 (noting the prevailing “doctrinal bifurcation 
of publicity and privacy rights”).  
 189 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 195 (1993). 
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audience, and others.190  This view also strips away the argument 
that the right of publicity is analogous to a privacy right because a 
privacy right is entirely contained within (and created by the 
existence of) one person.191 
Sometimes, however, scholars suggest that it is the Lockean 
property aspect that the right of publicity has outgrown.192  Some 
commentators reject the Lockean labor theory that underlies most 
intellectual property rights (i.e., the idea that the labor and creative 
energy put into an object make it property).193  Instead, scholars 
such as Dean Alice Haemmerli propose an alternate view: that the 
right of publicity is “a property right grounded in human 
autonomy.”194  This conception of the right of publicity eschews 
the idea that labor makes the right of publicity valued, and instead 
embraces the moral or personal aspects of the right of publicity.195  
This “Kantian” understanding avoids First Amendment concerns 
by making the right a purely personal one that can be exercised at 
will.196  This autonomous conception of the right of publicity 
would, in theory, allow a celebrity to object to any unauthorized 
use, regardless of its newsworthiness, because of its innate 
connection to the celebrity’s personhood.197 
Other scholars likewise focus on the underlying property 
interests that helped to generate the right, but do not reject its 
Lockean labor underpinnings.198  Professor David Westfall, for 
example, analyzes the role of the right of publicity in bankruptcy, 
martial assets, and other transferring situations to support his thesis 
 
 190 See id. at 193, 195. 
 191 See generally discussion supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the evolving definition of the 
right to privacy); Part I.A.1.a (discussing how some states have analogized the right to 
privacy to the right to publicity, and have broadly construed the right to privacy to cover 
claims that would otherwise be brought under right of publicity claims in other states). 
 192 See Haemmerli, supra note 178 (focusing instead on the moral and personal aspects 
of the right of publicity). 
 193 See, e.g., id. at 383. 
 194 Id. at 385. 
 195 Id. at 421–22. 
 196 See id. at 429–30. 
 197 Id. at 433 (“Indeed, with a freedom-based right capable of general application, [a 
celebrity] could theoretically object to any unauthorized use.”). 
 198 See, e.g., David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71 (2005). 
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that scholarship and courts alike should view publicity rights in the 
context of property.199  However, he warns against the tendency of 
judges and scholars alike to “fall victim to the property syllogism,” 
instead suggesting that the deeply personal nature of the right of 
publicity (as opposed to, for example, the less personal attachment 
an inventor has to a patent or a company to a trademark) should 
require that those analyzing the right of publicity “weigh 
competing policy concerns against one another every time a new 
context arises in which the label of property has consequences.”200  
Advocates of a stronger right of publicity who focus on the 
property aspects share a line of thought with advocates who focus 
on the economic implications of the right of publicity: both note 
the monetary value at stake in the right. 
3. Inherent Unfairness and Celebrities’ Need for Protection 
Scholars who advocate for a stronger right of publicity also 
reject assumptions that the right is not worth protecting because, 
for example, celebrities earn plenty of money already or are not 
harmed when their images are used.201  These arguments consider 
the literal value of the right of publicity, in the revenue brought in 
to tabloid magazines by their use of celebrity images, as well as the 
potential dangers that face celebrities when the actions of the 
paparazzi and tabloids are unregulated.202 
a) The Value of the Right of Publicity and Protection from 
“Free-Riding” 
Another dimension to the argument for a structured right of 
publicity is concerns about “free-riding;” that is, concerns about 
 
 199 See id. at 113–17. 
 200 Id. at 123. 
 201 See Goldman, supra note 126, at 614–15 (wryly noting that celebrities are already 
“well-compensated,” even without collecting on their right of publicity). 
 202 See Samantha J. Katze, Note, Hunting the Hunters: AB 381 and California’s 
Attempt to Restrain the Paparazzi, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1349, 
1351–53 (2006) (discussing accidents and break-in attempts by paparazzi and the 
constitutional challenge in regulating their behavior); see also David Tan, Beyond 
Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Cultural Studies, 25 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 913, 959–65 (2008) (examining the economic associative 
value of the celebrity personality). 
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the inherent unfairness from those using a celebrity identity in a 
commercial context without having to pay for each use.203  
Scholars argue that these concerns override the potential conflicts 
with the First Amendment by limiting enforcement of the right of 
publicity when a usage is potentially “newsworthy.”204 
Intellectual property attorney W. Mack Webner puts this 
position succinctly: “The press . . . should not, and need not, be 
exempt from paying for the use of the persona of a celebrity when 
the use is for purely commercial purposes.”205  Looking at two 
similar cases concerning sports figures, he finds that the grant of 
newsworthiness to the papers that used the players’ images, were it 
to be granted in any other context (e.g., a sports retailer) would 
“mock[] the publicity right” entirely.206  Like other commentators 
in this position, he finds troubling the fact that “[n]ewsworthiness 
is interpreted sufficiently loosely and broadly so that almost any 
activity associated with a press activity will be held to be under 
[its] umbrella.”207  Commentators recommend reducing the reach 
of the newsworthiness exception, and sharply identifying when the 
use of a celebrity’s image is commercial, so that the celebrity may 
advance his or her publicity right.208  “When . . . [publishers] use 
the images of celebrities in advertisements intended to sell their 
publications, they should pay for the use just as car manufacturers 
and clothing manufacturers must.”209  By this line of thinking, the 
subscription cards inserted into each Us Weekly, featuring pictures 
of actress Katie Holmes at an awards ceremony, would be violative 
 
 203 See Tan, supra note 202, at 932 (noting the law should prohibit free-riding for moral 
reasons); W. Mack Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line 
Between Commercial Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171, 
190, 194 (2004) (arguing that the press should not be able to use the property of others 
for commercial gain without compensating the owner). 
 204 See Webner & Lindquist, supra note 203, at 194. 
 205 Id. at 188. 
 206 Id. at 190. 
 207 Id. at 193. 
 208 See Tan, supra note 202, at 982, 992 (advocating a test that “takes into account a 
subjective inquiry into the intentions of the defendant”); Webner & Lindquist, supra note 
203, at 190 (arguing that the broad interpretation of “newsworthiness” currently applied 
by courts seems to allow newspapers and magazines a “free license to use celebrity 
personas”). 
 209 Webner & Lindquist, supra note 203, at 194. 
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of her right to publicity, and she should be compensated, just as 
she would be if she agreed to model clothes for Miu Miu.210 
Other scholars echo this view and deride the “free-riding 
exploitative commercial use” of celebrity images by tabloid 
magazines.211  One scholar, David Tan, notes that “the 
contemporary reality of the celebrity economy suggests a degree of 
protection ought to be accorded” to the celebrities.212  Tan suggests 
changing the inquiry in the newsworthiness exception to one of the 
defendants’ intentions; this would preserve First Amendment 
rights to artistic liberties (and, more broadly, the news) but would 
prevent this economic “free-riding.”213  These economic concerns 
hearken back to the property aspects of the right of publicity, but 
growing concerns about the safety of celebrities and others in the 
face of an unfettered paparazzi speak to the right of publicity’s 
privacy roots. 
b) Anti-Paparazzi Statutes 
The threatening presence of the paparazzi is troubling not only 
to celebrities, but those who are injured or otherwise disturbed by 
their aggressive, intrusive behavior, resulting in an increase of state 
legislation that targets the paparazzi.214  Car accidents from the 
mundane, such as Britney Spears running over the foot of a 
paparazzo,215 to the extreme, such as the deaths of Princess Diana 
and fiancé Dodi al Fayed after a high-speed pursuit by paparazzi 
on mopeds,216 have alerted state legislatures to the problems that 
 
 210 See generally Leisa Barnett, Katie Holmes’ Miu Miu Ad Unveiled, VOGUE U.K., Jan. 
14, 2009, http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/daily/090114-katie-holmes-miu-miu-ads-
unveiled.aspx. 
 211 Tan, supra note 202, at 992. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See id. at 982, 992–93. 
 214 See Katze, supra note 202, at 1352–53 (listing numerous traffic accidents and break-
ins caused by paparazzi tracking celebrities, which spurred the amendments to the Civil 
Code). 
 215 See generally Britney Spears Appears to Run over Foot of Celebrity Photographer, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/19/america 
/NA-GEN-US-Spears-Photographer.php. 
 216 See generally Coroner Plans Inquest in Death of Princess Diana for January, USA 
TODAY, Dec. 18, 2003, at 14, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-
12-18-diana-inquest_x.htm (discussing the lingering controversy about the accident). 
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face both celebrities and ordinary citizens on the roads when 
paparazzi try to get that perfect shot. 
California has amended its civil code to attempt to curb this 
behavior, or at least provide celebrities with other recourses.217  
Couched in the language of privacy, this statute ensnares 
aggressive paparazzi by denoting the acts of picture-taking, sound 
recording, or other invasive techniques, particularly when the 
plaintiff is engaged in a “personal or familial activity under 
circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy;”218 it also encompasses the tabloids that often employ 
them, whether or not there is an employee-employer 
relationship.219  However, the plaintiff engaging in these familial 
activities must have had a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”220 
Advocates of a strong right of publicity recognize the fact that 
celebrities are “followed, hounded and even harassed when they 
leave their homes.”221  Some promote a more expansive right of 
publicity not only to protect celebrities’ proprietary interests in 
their name and to prevent an overly expansive view of the 
newsworthiness exception, but also to shield celebrities from the 
aggressive and often dangerous tactics of the paparazzi.222 
These statutes serve not as a means of addressing the validity 
of the right of privacy or curbing its limitation by the First 
Amendment, but instead to comment on a different aspect of the 
problem of tabloid magazines: the very dangerous way in which 
these “candid” photos of celebrities are obtained. 
 
 217 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2010). 
 218 Id. § 1708.8(a)–(b) (creating liability when a person trespasses to capture these 
images or sounds, or invasion of privacy otherwise). 
 219 Id. § 1708.8(e). 
 220 Id. § 1708.8(b).  Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger recently signed an amendment to 
this law that expands the definition of privacy; the amendment took effect in January of 
2010. See Schwarzenegger Signs New Anti-Paparazzi Law, CNN, Oct. 14, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/10/14/paparazzi.law/index.html. 
 221 Willis, supra note 181, at 178. 
 222 See id. at 200–01. See generally Lisa Vance, Note, Amending Its Anti-Paparazzi 
Statute: California’s Latest Baby Step in Its Attempt to Curb the Aggressive Paparazzi, 
29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 99 (2006) (detailing the various amendments to 
California’s statute and suggesting changes for its success). 
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4. State Support for a Restrictive View of Newsworthiness 
Some commentators see the expansion of the right of publicity 
as being distinct from its property and its privacy origins.223  These 
commentators focus on the economic realities of the situation—
tabloids subverting the newsworthiness exception to their 
commercial advantage, and encouraging more and more aggressive 
behavior by the paparazzi they employ directly or indirectly.224  
The concerns advanced by these commentators are not without 
support in the case law.  In fact, courts’ restrictions on the 
newsworthiness exception reflect these opinions and suggest that 
the right of publicity is broadening in two influential states, 
California and New York.225 
a) California 
Courts have placed certain restrictions on the newsworthiness 
exception, providing greater protection to celebrities who 
challenge the legitimacy of publications claiming that their use 
falls under these exceptions. 
In Solano,226 actor Jose Solano, Jr., at the time well-recognized 
for his portrayal of a character on the beach-drama Baywatch, was 
featured on the cover of Playgirl, a pornographic magazine 
“ostensibly focused on a female readership.”227  Solano neither 
posed for the magazine nor granted them an interview, and, 
perhaps disappointingly to the readership, did not appear nude 
anywhere in the issue.228  Despite such promising cover taglines as 
“Primetime’s Sexy Young Stars Exposed” and “12 Sizzling 
Centerfolds Ready to Score With You” framing the cover image of 
Solano, his sole appearance in the magazine was a clothed picture 
 
 223 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 224 See, e.g., Vance, supra note 222, at 102 (describing aggressive tactics used by the 
paparazzi in pursuit of a celebrity). 
 225 See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (restricting the 
newsworthiness exception in California); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727–28 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 226 This case is briefly discussed supra text accompanying notes 147–49. 
 227 Id. at 1080. 
 228 Id. 
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with a brief profile as part of a relatively tame (and non-nude) 
article about rising television stars.229 
Solano sued the magazine on a variety of privacy and publicity 
claims under California law, claiming both a violation of the right 
of publicity statute, as well as the common law right of 
publicity.230  The court of appeals disagreed with the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, which held that the use fell 
under the newsworthiness exception and therefore denied recovery 
to Solano.231  Instead, the court of appeals found that Solano had 
raised a genuine issue as to whether the magazine had used the 
picture, despite knowing that its representation was false.232  The 
court remanded the case to the district court with a warning that the 
newsworthiness exception was not infinite and that malicious 
intent or knowing falsehoods could remove its protection 
entirely.233 
Similarly, the court in Eastwood refused to allow an entirely 
“unfettered press.”234  The National Enquirer, a prominent 
supermarket tabloid, published an article claiming that actor Clint 
Eastwood had found himself in a tumultuous “love triangle” 
between singer Tanya Tucker (with whom he allegedly “publicly 
‘cuddled’” for ten nights) and actress Sondra Locke (who 
purportedly “camped at his doorstep” to beg him to take her 
back).235  Eastwood was not as amused or entertained as the 
tabloid-buying public may have been and sued the tabloid for, 
among other things, both a violation of the statutory right of 
publicity and the complementary common law right.236  Though 
the court acknowledged that there were exceptions to be made for 
public interest, particularly involving “‘people who, by their 
accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, 
 
 229 Id. at 1081. 
 230 Id. at 1088.  The court here terms the common law right of publicity as “commercial 
misappropriation invasion of privacy.” Id. 
 231 Id. at 1089. 
 232 See id. 
 233 Id.  Over six years later, the case is still pending on remand, probably due to some 
form of settlement agreement between the two parties. 
 234 Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 235 Id. at 345. 
 236 See id. at 347. 
C04_GRANO_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:08 PM 
2010] CELEBRITY BABY PICTURES 647 
create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities,’”237 
it also recognized that this exception should not come at the “total 
sacrifice” of celebrities who work to maintain their status.238  
Although Eastwood’s claim ultimately failed because he failed to 
specifically allege in his cause of action the “scienter of the alleged 
calculated falsehood” of the Enquirer article, the court still 
recognized that aggressive tabloid behavior would not 
automatically be protected by the newsworthiness exception.239  
The court noted that “[t]he spacious interest in an unfettered press 
is not without limitation” and that knowing or reckless lies 
“masquerading as truth” were not exempt in the otherwise broad 
“canopy of ‘news.’”240 
These examples show California courts’ willingness to 
question the reach of the newsworthiness exception for tabloids, 
particularly when permitting the misuse of the plaintiff’s image or 
name under First Amendment concerns is, in the court’s view, 
somehow injurious or unfair. 
b) New York 
New York courts have also sought to reduce the scope of the 
newsworthiness exception.  For example, a New York court found 
that the newsworthiness exception was not applicable even in the 
case of an image of a likeness of a celebrity (never mind an actual 
photograph of the celebrity, as in Solano).241  Muhammad Ali, the 
famous boxer and self-proclaimed “the Greatest,” brought an 
action against Playgirl magazine for a cover sketch that depicted a 
nude black man in a boxing ring, with features very similar to his 
 
 237 Id. at 350 (quoting Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1962)). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 352. 
 240 Id. (citations omitted).  Although Eastwood’s recognition of knowing falsehood 
exception has been recognized by some (though not all) other California decisions, part 
of the case has been overruled by a 1984 amendment to the California right of publicity 
statute: it is no longer true that the misuse of the plaintiff’s image be for “purposes of 
advertising” or “solicitation of purchases.” See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 713, 717 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing the amendment to section 3344). 
 241 See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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own, captioned “the Greatest.”242  The court acknowledged the 
newsworthiness exception to the statute, but found that Playgirl’s 
use of Ali’s likeness did not fall under the exception.243  Instead, 
the court held that the likeness of Ali was “clearly included in the 
magazine solely ‘for purposes of trade e.  g. [sic], merely to attract 
attention.’”244  The court did not hesitate to eliminate the 
possibility of the newsworthiness exception, even contending that 
the text accompanying the portrait was a “plainly fictional and 
allegedly libellous [sic] bit of doggerel.”245  This decision could 
have had wide-ranging implications for tabloids in particular, since 
shocking covers are created expressly to attract attention.246 
B. Protecting the Public’s Interest: Arguments for a Weaker Right 
of Publicity 
In contrast to those who advocate a wider, more protective 
right of publicity, many scholars have taken their cues from courts 
who have painted a broad picture of the newsworthiness exception.  
These scholars present a right of publicity that favors the public 
interest—or a world where the right of publicity ceases to exist 
entirely.247  These scholars emphasize a broad expanse of 
newsworthiness to protect First Amendment concerns or feel that 
the expanding right of publicity impinges on the territory of other 
established intellectual property rights.248 
The problem with analyzing the case law of any given 
jurisdiction is the expansive and often inexplicable gaps in the case 
law.  Although chronological gaps are the most noticeable, these 
lurches in time are enhanced by the fact that celebrities often resort 
to many different theories of recovery in scattershot filings that 
allege violations of the right of publicity, defamation, false light 
 
 242 Id. at 725. 
 243 Id. at 727. 
 244 Id. (quoting Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). 
 245 Id. at 727. 
 246 However, like most right of publicity cases, the case was not followed widely by 
other courts, and its holding has not been acknowledged for many years. 
 247 See Goldman, supra note 126, at 216–25 (arguing that a right of publicity conflicts 
with free market, First Amendment, and copyright interests). 
 248 See id. 
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torts, and anything that will “stick.”249  This means that many right 
of publicity claims are subsumed by tort recovery, never making it 
to the trial stage, or, as previously mentioned, are settled out of 
court. 
1. Eliminating the Right of Publicity Entirely 
Professor Lee Goldman advocates dispensing entirely with the 
right of publicity.250  He notes a number of economic concerns, 
such as that the right of publicity “encumbers free enterprise and 
competition by granting the individual monopoly control over the 
commercial value of his or her persona.”251  However, his main 
contention is that the right of publicity is unnecessary.252  He posits 
the idea that celebrities, unlike creators of other forms of 
intellectual property, do not need a monetary incentive to “create” 
their image.253  Expressing concern that the right is not simply 
“unnecessary” but also “undesirable,” Goldman discourages a 
societal view where fame has economic benefits on its own aside 
from the celebrity’s primary activity, such as acting, athletics, or 
otherwise.254 
This view is fairly extreme, and Goldman himself 
acknowledges that “there does not appear to be any ground swell 
of support for such legislation [preempting the right of 
publicity].”255  If the right of publicity were eliminated entirely, 
celebrities pursuing claims against tabloids or online gossip 
websites would be in the same situation they were prior to the 
development of right of publicity; they would have to rely on 
defamation, privacy, or other intellectual property claims to 
 
 249 See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) (claiming that 
the magazine depicted Solano in a “false light”); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 342, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating the cause of action is for “false light invasion 
of privacy”). 
 250 See generally Goldman, supra note 126. 
 251 Id. at 614. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See id. at 603 (“Actors love to act; sports stars enjoy the competition.  Even for the 
more mercenary, the rewards of the primary activity are often so great that additional 
incentives are superfluous.”). 
 254 Id. at 604–05. 
 255 Id. at 628. 
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recover for misuse of their image.  However, Goldman’s idea that 
the right of publicity differs from other rights is similarly framed 
by other legal scholars’ concerns that the right of publicity is 
infringing on the domain of other intellectual property rights. 
2. The Need to Distinguish the Right from Other Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Other scholars concerned with the development of the right of 
publicity express fears that its continued expansion will encroach 
on existing intellectual property law, thus obscuring the purposes 
of the individual—and separate—rights of publicity.256  Scholars 
such as Tan strive to differentiate the right of publicity from the 
development of trademark law.257  Tan notes that celebrities often 
assert a right of publicity claim in addition to or instead of a 
Lanham Act claim.258  This conflation of the two claims confuses 
the “purpose” of the misuse—is it to mislead the consumer (e.g., a 
tabloid reader) into thinking that the celebrity has sponsored the 
use of the image, or is it to recoup economic benefits?259  When 
courts confuse the two, the recovery allowed may vary, and 
moreover, the purpose of the right of publicity is confused.260  
Instead of recognizing that the right of publicity is property itself, a 
trademark claim attempting to cover the right of publicity merely 
considers the use of the image “an indicia of origin or source of a 
product.”261  So, if Lindsay Lohan wanted to sue Star Magazine for 
featuring her in an ad for their publication, the use of a Lanham 
Act claim instead of a right of publicity claim would seem to 
indicate only that the origin of the magazine ad is misleading, 
rather than that the magazine had misappropriated her image, 
which had value on its own.  To counteract this problem, Tan 
advocates a right of publicity that steps away from trademark-like 
aspects and instead focuses on the economic impact.262 
 
 256 See infra notes 257–66 and accompanying text. 
 257 See, e.g., Tan, supra note 202, at 992. 
 258 Id. at 978. 
 259 See id. at 982. 
 260 See generally id. at 978–83. 
 261 Id. at 978. 
 262 See id. at 992. 
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Other scholars note a similar interference of the right of 
publicity in copyright claims and criticize the broadening scope of 
the right.263  Some scholars claim that an expansive right of 
publicity encroaches on copyright claims and results in 
incongruous outcomes, when the right to publicity should be 
preempted by copyright.264  For instance, “[a]n unfettered right of 
publicity . . . can conflict with copyright principles, and abrogate 
copyright protections,” which is particularly troublesome because 
this outcome “is exactly what Congress sought to prevent by 
enacting 301 [of the Copyright Act] preemption.”265  These legal 
scholars propose a more limited right of publicity to counteract 
these concerns.266 
The similarities to other intellectual property rights can 
sometimes lead to the conflation of the right of publicity with these 
rights.  This argument suggests that a limiting federal scheme 
would eke out a place for the right of publicity without 
overshadowing or nullifying existing intellectual property rights. 
3. Protection of the First Amendment and the Press 
First Amendment concerns are at the heart of many arguments 
opposed to expanding either the right of publicity or its 
newsworthiness exception.  The balance between the privacy rights 
of the individual and the newsgathering rights of the public often 
tips in the favor of the public under the doctrine of free speech.267 
Professor Goldman is particularly protective of the First 
Amendment concerns that arise from limiting the press’s right to 
report or comment on public figures, finding that they trump any 
potential use for the right of publicity.268  He is not convinced by 
 
 263 See, e.g., Farbod Moridani, Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.: Persona and the Unfettered 
Right of Publicity, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 317 (2006) (“[T]he scope of this right 
has come into question because it primarily benefits celebrities and, in its broadest 
application, conflicts with fundamental principles underlying copyright law.”). 
 264 See id. at 333; Fisher, supra note 184, at 115 (advocating “a middle of the road 
option under which a more adequate balancing system, such as that under the Copyright 
Act” guides the right of publicity). 
 265 Moridani, supra note 263, at 333. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Tan, supra note 202, at 924–25. 
 268 Goldman, supra note 126, at 614. 
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the “free-riding” argument, instead declaring that “in the absence 
of a convincing rationale for the right of publicity, even 
commercial speech should receive First Amendment 
protection.”269  The removal of the right of publicity would not 
leave celebrities defenseless, but would prioritize the rights of the 
public and validate newsworthiness exceptions.270 
Others take a less extreme view, but still advocate the 
importance of the First Amendment in connection with the right of 
publicity.  Many are troubled by attempts to limit the broad 
protections of the newsworthiness amendment, suggesting instead 
a form of categorization that better discerns between commercial 
and non-commercial speech (the latter receiving full protection 
under the First Amendment) rather than elimination of the 
newsworthiness protection entirely.271  Professor Eugene Volokh 
advances four potential categories to differentiate between types of 
speech, in order to obtain the maximum protections of the 
newsworthiness exception.272  Like other scholars, he fears that a 
limitation of the newsworthiness exception, or a broad definition of 
what defines “commercial” (i.e., unprotected) speech will limit the 
freedom of speech generally, as defining commercial speech is a 
difficult task.273 
First Amendment concerns seem inextricably intertwined with 
the newsworthiness exception, which reflects many of the core 
concerns of scholars opposed to a broad federal right of 
publicity.274  According to these scholars, to expand the right of 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 See id. 
 271 See id. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003). 
 272 Volokh, supra note 271, at 904 (listing the four categories: non-commercial speech 
favored by the right of publicity; commercial advertisements for those kinds of non-
commercial speech; other kinds of commercial advertisements; and non-commercial 
speech that is not protected by the right of publicity). 
 273 Id. at 928–29 (“Both commercial speech and noncommercial speech that uses 
people’s appearance without their consent is equally harmful, both to the subjects’ 
economic interests and their dignity.  Different treatment of commercial and 
noncommercial advertising thus seems . . . unjustified.”).  Volokh notes, somewhat 
hopefully, that the Supreme Court (in 2003) currently seemed to be leaning in the 
direction of protecting commercial speech. Id. 
 274 See supra notes 267–73 and accompanying text. 
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publicity would unfairly tread into the domain of free speech and 
First Amendment protections.275 
4. Broadly Defining the Newsworthiness Exception 
Because case law concerning the right of publicity varies not 
only between states (here, New York and California) but also 
within the states themselves, there are many courts that endorse the 
positions of scholars concerned with the direction of the right of 
publicity, and particularly its impact on First Amendment 
freedoms.276  Courts have seemingly ignored previous verdicts 
restricting the newsworthiness exception in favor of protecting free 
speech and a free press under the First Amendment.277  Some also 
deflect concerns that an economic harm is being perpetrated 
against the celebrity (or ignore it entirely) for the sake of creating a 
broad newsworthiness exception and fuller protections for all 
aspects of the First Amendment when it clashes with the right of 
publicity.278 
For example, in a pictorial in its March 1997 issue, Los 
Angeles Magazine (“LAM”) digitally altered famous stills from 
movies to show actors such as Cary Grant, Marilyn Monroe, and 
plaintiff Dustin Hoffman wearing spring 1997 fashions.279  The 
photograph chosen of Hoffman was an image from the movie 
Tootsie, in a scene where Hoffman, in drag, is dressed in a red 
evening gown in front of the American flag; LAM digitally 
replaced the dress with a cream evening gown and matching heels, 
noting that Hoffman “[wasn’t] a drag in a butter-colored silk gown 
by Richard Tyler and Ralph Lauren heels.”280 
Hoffman claimed that, by failing to secure his permission for 
publication and alteration of the photo, the magazine had violated 
his statutory and common law protections against misappropriation 
of the right of publicity.281  The district court agreed, finding that 
 
 275 See supra notes 267–73 and accompanying text 
 276 See cases cited infra notes 279–94 and accompanying text. 
 277 See cases cited infra notes 279–94 and accompanying text. 
 278 See cases cited infra notes 279–94 and accompanying text. 
 279 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 280 Id. at 1182–83. 
 281 Id. at 1183. 
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First Amendment protections did not attach to knowingly false 
speech and that LAM had acted with actual malice.282  However, 
the Ninth Circuit held otherwise.283  The Ninth Circuit held instead 
that the article and its accompanying images were not purely 
commercial speech, but instead a “combination of fashion 
photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment.”284  
Because LAM was accorded full First Amendment protections, its 
protections could only be revoked with a showing of actual malice, 
which the court refused to find—the article had made clear that the 
images were altered.285  The court entered judgment for LAM.286 
Another example comes from New York.  Ann-Margret, an 
actress and “woman of beauty, talent, and courage,” objected 
strenuously when an adult magazine, High Society Celebrity Skin, 
published a photographic still taken from one of her movies in 
which she appeared topless.287  The magazine “specialize[d] in 
printing photographs of well-known women caught in the most 
revealing situations and positions that . . . [it is] able to obtain.”288  
Although the plaintiff attempted to categorize the publication as 
“hard core pornography,” the court settled on “tacky.”289 
Relying on section 51 of the Civil Rights Laws, Ann-Margret 
claimed that her right of publicity had been violated by this 
unauthorized reproduction of the topless scene.290  The court 
disagreed; it first held that her claim for a violation of the right to 
privacy (ignoring, seemingly, the fact that her claim concerned the 
right of publicity) was barred by the fact that she had already 
willingly appeared in the film, which was seen by millions of 
movie-goers.291  The court went on to state that, as “a woman who 
has occupied the fantasies of many moviegoers over the years,” 
 
 282 Id. at 1184 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874–75 
(C.D. Cal. 1999)). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 1185. 
 285 See id. at 1186–88. 
 286 Id. at 1189. 
 287 Ann-Margret v. High Soc’y Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 403–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 288 Id. at 403. 
 289 Id. at 403–04. 
 290 Id. at 404. 
 291 Id. at 405. 
C04_GRANO_3-21-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:08 PM 
2010] CELEBRITY BABY PICTURES 655 
Ann-Margret’s topless appearance in one of her films was a matter 
of great public interest, and thereby protected by the 
newsworthiness exception.292  The court focused more on the 
actress’s “choice” to appear naked, rather than her loss of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.293 
The court avoided explicitly stating whether or not a common 
law right to publicity exists in New York, but denied recovery via 
that route nonetheless, finding that the appearance of the picture in 
the magazine did not constitute a use for trade or advertising 
purposes.294 
These examples of broad applications of the newsworthiness 
protections are likely not welcomed by the celebrities who fill the 
pages of tabloid magazines, but offer more protection to the public 
in the form of preserving a free press. 
C. The Role of Gossip in Society and the Media 
For better or for worse, tabloids are inextricably linked with 
another word that either categorizes or blasphemes—gossip.  
Gossip’s role in the news and in the law has been the subject of 
plenty of debate, although perhaps not given as serious attention as 
other First Amendment concerns.  Gossip even inspired Brandeis 
and Warren in their initial discussion about the need for privacy: 
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and 
persistently circulated, is potent for evil.  It both 
belittles and perverts.  It belittles by inverting the 
relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the 
thoughts and aspirations of a people.  When 
personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and 
crowds the space available for matters of real 
interest to the community, what wonder that the 
ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative 
importance.295 
 
 292 Id. 
 293 See id. 
 294 See id. at 406–07. 
 295 Brandeis & Warren, supra note 30, at 196. 
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Brandeis and Warren may have had personal motivations for 
rallying the cry against protection of gossip and rumors,296 but 
modern courts are unclear as to whether or not gossip is 
newsworthy; i.e., are rumors protectable by the First 
Amendment?297  Indulging in celebrity gossip is a guilty pleasure 
that has been acknowledged by courts for a good part of the last 
century, even preceding the named “right of publicity.”298  A New 
York court noted that “the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors 
and ‘public figures’ are subjects of considerable interest and 
discussion by the rest of the population;”299 although the court did 
not particularly condone this vice, it found that “when such are the 
mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their 
expression in the newspapers, books and magazines of the day.”300 
Gossip’s potential to conflict with the knowing falsehood 
exception eliminates it from protection in certain instances.  The 
court in Eastwood was troubled by the implications of the Enquirer 
story; on one hand, the subject of the article was a matter of public 
concern, but on the other, it was potentially a “calculated 
falsehood” and simply a “coverup or subterfuge for commercial 
appropriation of his name and likeness.”301  The court avoided 
weighing the interests at stake by finding that, regardless of the 
outcome, Eastwood had failed to plead that the article was 
knowingly false.302  This begs the question of whether publications 
are free to print unsubstantiated gossip (particularly when it so 
closely resembles a “breaking news”-type story), placing the 
burden of proving the falseness on the target of the publication.303 
 
 296 McCarthy and others allude to the rumors surrounding the circumstances of the 
article—Brandeis’s sister’s lavish wedding at the center of Bostonian society and the 
negative press coverage that it generated may have inspired the pair to write the article. 
See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 1:12.  Fittingly, this story is essentially just a rumor. 
 297 See infra notes 298–303 and accompanying text. 
 298 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).  The Sidis 
case predates Haelan by more than a decade. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); supra text accompanying note 89. 
 299 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809. 
 300 Id. 
 301 Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 302 Id. at 352. 
 303 The court in Eastwood noted that this is the allocation of the burden in a claim for 
defamation or invasion of privacy. See id. 
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1. Baby Pictures 
During the last several years, the parasitic relationship of 
intrusive celebrity magazines feeding off of the publicity generated 
by the Hollywood elite has evolved into a symbiotic one through 
the sale of baby pictures.  Before Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt 
earned $14 million for the exclusive rights to photographs of their 
newborn twins, they received $4 million from the sale of pictures 
of their first daughter together, Shiloh, in 2005.304  In July of 2008, 
actress Jessica Alba sold rights to the first photos of her daughter 
Honor to OK! magazine for $1.5 million.305  Pop star Christina 
Aguilera made the same amount when she sold the exclusive rights 
to photographs of her son Max to People in 2007.306  Even Jennifer 
Lopez, who has been out of the acting and musical spotlight for 
several years, made an estimated $6 million when People 
purchased the rights to the first images of her twins Max and 
Emme in March of 2008.307  This trend may have been curbed by 
the faltering global economy, but there are indications that neither 
celebrities’ willingness to sell their private moments, nor the 
public’s desire to consume such articles, have abated.308 
Of course, with each photo spread comes not only the royalty 
check, but a carefully vetted, favorable news story, showcasing the 
celebrity and their newborn in the best possible light.  For an 
example of the flowing, cloying language, one can note how 
Jennifer Lopez is overwhelmed with “twin bliss” as People reveals 
the “intimate” secrets of the “happy new parents.”309  These sales 
have hardly seemed to subside despite claims from some magazine 
 
 304 The $4 million the couple earned went to charity, as it did three years later when the 
rights to pictures of their twins were sold. Jolie-Pitt Baby Pics, supra note 3. 
 305 Baby Alba Cashes in, TMZ, July 10, 2008, http://www.tmz.com/2008/07/10/baby-
alba-cashes-in/; see also World Exclusive: Jessica’s Dream Baby!, OK!, July 16, 2008, 
http://www.okmagazine.com/2008/07/world-exclusive-jessica-albas-dream-baby-7881/ 
(advertising the “world exclusive” pictures of baby Honor, featured “only in OK!”). 
 306 Baram & Sheila, supra note 4. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Former Playboy girlfriend Kendra Wilkinson has documented the various stages of 
her marriage and pregnancy with “exclusives” given to Us Weekly.  See, e.g., Kendra’s 
New Baby Drama!, US WKLY., Oct. 5, 2009, at 89. 
 309 See Jennifer Lopez: Twin Bliss!, PEOPLE, Mar. 20, 2008, at C1. 
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editors that they are trying to halt the trend of purchasing these 
images. 
2. The Ugly Side of Free Press 
However cheerful the stories of newlywed or newborn bliss 
appear in the magazines, celebrities often find themselves vilified 
by online bloggers.  Although those who write online gossip 
websites310 are often able to hide under the mantle of anonymity, 
sometimes their cutting remarks are not shrugged off by the 
celebrities, such as in the case of blogger Mario Lavandeira, better 
known as Perez Hilton, and D.J. Samantha Ronson.311  After 
Hilton’s blog posted an article claiming that Ronson planted 
cocaine in then-girlfriend Lindsay Lohan’s car to generate 
publicity and attempted to trade on Lohan’s celebrity status for 
better publicity for herself, Ronson sued Hilton and the photo 
agency for $20 million.312  Although her claim was for defamation, 
it could easily have been for right of publicity; she could have 
claimed (probably rightly so) that the scandalous story on Hilton’s 
website brought in advertising revenue.  Hilton, however, could 
use the same excuse he used in the defamation lawsuit: that his 
actions were protected under the First Amendment right that 
protects the news and free speech.313  Much like in this defamation 
lawsuit, Ronson’s claims could potentially be blocked if a court 
were to find that Hilton was reporting news (which the public has a 
right to know), rather than trading on her right of publicity.314 
 
 310 See supra note 173. 
 311 See Posting of Castina to PopCrunch, DJ Samantha Ronson Files $20 Millon [sic] 
Libel Suit Against Perez Hilton and Celebrity Babylon, http://www.popcrunch.com/dj-
samantha-ronson-files-20-millon-libel-suit-against-perez-hilton-and-celebrity-babylon/ 
(July 15, 2007). 
 312 Id. 
 313 Posting of Castina to PopCrunch, Samantha Ronson Perez Hilton Defamation 
Lawsuit Goes to Court, http://www.popcrunch.com/samantha-ronson-perez-hilton-
defamation-lawsuit-goes-to-court/ (Oct. 11, 2007) (quoting Hilton’s lawyer stating that 
his client “believes that the First Amendment protects him”). 
 314 Although the unreported case allegedly came out in Hilton’s favor, Ronson’s legal 
troubles were far from behind her.  Her own lawyers filed suit against her after she failed 
to pay their fees; she countersued, claiming she was overcharged and misinformed. See 
Posting of Nyzombie to The Insider, DJ Sam Ronson Suing Her Former Attorneys, 
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Although no claims concerning a celebrity’s right to publicity 
against an online publication have been reported yet, the growing 
popularity of internet gossip will create more opportunities for 
lawsuits to arise. 
III. THE NEED FOR A LESS RESTRICTIVE FEDERAL RIGHT 
The final Part of this Note advocates the adoption of a federal 
statute incorporating various states’ approaches to the right of 
publicity.  It also emphasizes the history of federalization of 
intellectual property rights as a basis for federalizing the right of 
publicity.  This Part then suggests a potential structure for the 
federal statute, including an expansive newsworthiness exception 
to protect First Amendment concerns and finds that an appropriate 
federal statute should acknowledge the privacy aspects that have 
underscored the right of publicity throughout its history—
expectations which are now being eroded by the sales of baby 
pictures. 
A. Uniformity by Federal Statute 
A federal statute should be established for the right of publicity 
to clarify inconsistencies between states, to bring a right of 
publicity to states that do not yet recognize the right,315 and to 
acknowledge the changing mores of society. 
First, the common law of most states no longer adequately 
recognizes the interests at stake in the face of new technology and 
aggressive public interest in the lives of celebrities.  In recognizing 
the right of publicity for the first time, courts have found that “the 
absence of precedent is a feeble argument” because “[t]he common 
law system would have withered centuries ago had it lacked the 
ability to expand and adapt to the social, economic, and political 
changes inherent in a vibrant human society.”316  Eliminating the 
right of publicity entirely would indeed protect First Amendment 
 
http://www.theinsider.com/news/857258_DJ_Sam_Ronson_Suing_Her_Former_Attorne 
ys (May 2, 2008). 
 315 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 316 Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, Inc., 441 P.2d 141, 143 (Haw. 1968); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 57–58. 
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concerns,317 but it would entirely ignore the legal development of 
the right of publicity, which protects important interests not 
adequately recognized under privacy law. 
Second, a federal right of publicity would allow for more 
uniform results among and within states and would allow a 
celebrity to assert his or her rights in any jurisdiction.  The current 
differences between states are particularly notable in the 
newsworthiness exception.  Both California and New York have 
found that the underlying misrepresentation in a publication can 
completely remove its newsworthiness protections.318  However, 
neither state has consistently applied the newsworthiness exception 
or explicitly stated what types of “news” are not protected, other 
than those that are outright (and knowingly) false.319  A federal 
statute would provide a clear framework to distinguish the 
newsworthiness exception and acknowledge its roots in the First 
Amendment as well as in defamation law. 
B. Federalization of Other IP Rights 
A federal right of publicity would acknowledge its core 
difference from the right to privacy accepted by most states, by 
recognizing publicity as a type of self-generated property, with 
pecuniary value.320  Most other intellectual property rights are 
federalized, as seen in the examples of copyright and patent, which 
started out federalized, and trademarks, which required 
federalization after enforcement became difficult between different 
jurisdictions and detracted from its core goals.321  The right of 
publicity has outgrown its common law roots, and courts resort to 
other doctrines, such as privacy law, to cover its aspects.322  Other 
intellectual property rights were federalized for the same reasons: 
inconsistent results across the country and the necessity for a 
creator or owner of intellectual property to protect his or her rights 
 
 317 See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text. 
 318 See supra Part II.A.4. 
 319 See supra Part II.A.4. 
 320 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 321 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 322 See supra Part I.A.1.a. 
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on a nationwide scale.323  In this respect, the right of publicity 
reflects the development of trademark law, more than the 
straightforward history of copyrights or patents.324  Like 
trademarks, which courts first addressed through the tort of unfair 
competition,325 the right of publicity has outgrown the stop-gap 
measures found in tort law and requires a uniform federal statute.  
Careful drafting will also prevent the statute from encroaching on 
the domain of other intellectual property rights and prevent courts 
from overriding or ignoring these rights in favor of analyzing the 
nebulous right of publicity.326 
C. Proposition for a Federal Statute 
1. Wording 
Both statutes studied in this Note, those of New York and 
California, form a good foundation for crafting the language of a 
federal statute.327  A federal statute should contain language similar 
to these statutes, but should omit or modify the language that has 
tripped up many a court—for example, the ambiguous “portrait” in 
the New York statute.328  The federal statute should include 
specific terms, such as California’s inclusion of “name, voice, 
signature, [and] photograph.”329  However, the broad category of 
“image” or “likeness” or “photograph,”330 enclosed as a catch-all 
in many state statutes, must be addressed somehow in the federal 
statute.  It is difficult to choose a word with such nuanced meaning 
that it can be interpreted the same way universally but still include 
the broad and bizarre reaches of the tabloids, such as a nude 
sketch331 or a cartoon M&M.332  “Image” is the broadest but most 
 
 323 See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 324 Compare supra Part I.A.2.a., with Part I.B. 
 325 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
 326 See supra notes 256–66 and accompanying text. 
 327 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 328 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 329 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010). 
 330 See generally id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAWS §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1101 (West 2001). 
 331 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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helpful and could be contained from spiraling to encompass too 
much by a descriptive appendix or legislative history to the 
statute.333 
A federal statute might read as follows: Any person or 
organization who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or image, for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, 
without such person’s prior consent, shall be liable for any 
damages sustained by the person injured as a result thereof or must 
disgorge any profits unfairly obtained from the misuse.334 
2. Inclusion of Newsworthiness Exception 
The newsworthiness exception should be included and 
acknowledged at the federal level through statutory codification, as 
it is in California.335  This would recognize the nationwide reach of 
most publications, especially the rising influence of the internet 
and its ever-expanding list of gossip websites.336  Moreover, it 
would protect First Amendment concerns and give freedom, but 
not free reign, to the press.  The newsworthiness exception at the 
federal level should acknowledge several exceptions of its own.  
First, it should incorporate New York’s reasonable relation 
requirement.337  Pictures of celebrities arguably are the selling 
point for most celebrity publications, and it would seem 
incongruous to let these publications skirt a violation of the right of 
publicity by using, for example, a cover picture of Brad Pitt and 
 
 332 See Burck v. Mars, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1330, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47861 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 23, 2008). 
 333 Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit would not agree with extending a right of 
control over images that evoke a celebrity’s identity. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 334 This language is based on both the New York and California Statutes. See CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51.  For the sake of clarity, certain phrases 
have been excerpted from this example—the federal statute would, of course, need to 
address minors’ ability to give consent, how damages would be calculated, whether the 
right of publicity applies to products (such as commemorative plates), etc., as has been 
done at the state level.  It also would likely include more broad language (e.g., “person or 
persons,” etc.). 
 335 See supra Part I.B.3.a. 
 336 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 337 See supra Part I.B.3.b. 
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Angelina Jolie to publicize an article inside the magazine that was 
about trout-fishing.  Second, it is not necessary to acknowledge a 
knowing falsehood or actual malice standard.338  This suggestion 
comes not from a feeling of schadenfreude at the misfortune that 
befalls a celebrity who sees herself vilified on a tabloid cover 
story,339 but because defamation and libel laws are already well-
established and are better suited for addressing these claims.340  
Recourse for hurt feelings and damaged reputations should be 
recovered via these pathways, not through claims brought under 
the right of publicity, which should focus instead on the property 
right aspects.341 
D. Gossip as a Protectable Interest 
The reasoning of Brandeis and Warren is outdated in the 
context of publicity rights.342  Protection of gossip, no matter how 
tenuous the “news” it reports, should still be protected by the First 
Amendment because “[t]he compass of the First Amendment 
covers a vast spectrum of tastes, views, ideas and expressions.”343  
It is of little doubt to most courts that the ins and outs of 
celebrities’ daily lives, no matter how mundane pictures of stars 
acting “just like us” may seem, are of public interest.  As Judge 
Valente of the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division 
reluctantly admitted, “We cannot undertake to pass judgment on 
those reading tastes.”344  Courts—and, by turn, the legislature—
should not restrict the rights of the press simply because the news 
reported is sensational and concerns an individual.345  Hence, the 
 
 338 See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Even though the 
[newsworthiness] exceptions are to be broadly construed, the newsworthiness privileges 
do not apply where a defendant uses a plaintiff’s name and likeness in a knowingly false 
manner to increase sales of the publication.”). 
 339 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 340 Nonetheless, due to the almost universal inclusion of this exception at the state level, 
it would be somewhat difficult to eliminate it from the federal level, particularly if the 
point of the statute is to clarify the limits of the right of publicity, not to obfuscate them. 
 341 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 342 See supra notes 295–98 and accompanying text. 
 343 Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Pring v. 
Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982)). 
 344 Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958). 
 345 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). 
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newsworthiness exception to the right of publicity allows courts to 
balance the privacy interests of such an individual with the public 
interest to be informed, whether by The New York Times or by Us 
Weekly.346  While placing the burden on the target of the 
publication to prove falsity could encourage the proliferation of 
untrue articles in certain publications that are unconcerned with 
their reputation (i.e., tabloids), it is no different than the 
expectations of privacy or defamation law.347 
E. What Is Newsworthy Now? 
For all its growth, the right of publicity cannot and should not 
ignore its roots in privacy law.348  The newsworthiness exception 
incorporates these privacy concerns while recognizing First 
Amendment limitations—celebrities have the ability to make 
something newsworthy or not by their actions.  It is unreasonable 
to expect perfect privacy when one willingly invites a magazine 
into one’s home (e.g., to take the baby pictures exclusively 
promised to the magazine).349  Is it reasonable for a celebrity to 
collect millions of dollars for the exclusive rights to pictures of her 
baby along with an approved, positive story about the family, and 
then sue a publication for a negative story that casts her in an 
unfavorable light, expecting privacy during her sweaty gym 
workout or rekindled romance with a married coworker?  This 
author argues that this would be an unreasonable result, both 
because it goes against the notions of privacy grounded in 
Prosser’s four torts,350 and also because it encroaches too greatly 
on the First Amendment.  It is unfair to attempt to manipulate the 
media into posting only favorable stories (no celebrity has 
seemingly ever sued on a story that cast a glowing light on their 
actions).  By recognizing a newsworthiness exception in a federal 
statute, courts would have the liberty to analyze the privacy 
implications of celebrities’ actions and consider just how private a 
 
 346 See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002), for a discussion of 
the newsworthiness exception. 
 347 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 348 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 349 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 350 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
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celebrity’s life can be when that life is featured on glossy cover 
pages brokered by the celebrity herself.  At the same time, these 
courts would be able to acknowledge the property underpinnings 
of the right by recognizing situations in which the economic 
interests of the celebrity are violated by “free-riding” publications.  
In a sense, an expanded federal right of publicity with this 
emphasis would force celebrities to choose where to reap the 
benefits of their celebrity: either through selling stories and 
pictorials to magazines, thereby reducing their privacy 
expectations, or by preserving their privacy and collecting 
damages through suits against magazines that exploited their right 
of publicity. 
Even under this type of statutory scheme, however, federal 
courts might be without guidance in certain circumstances.  
Consider the celebrity family who recently profited from sales of 
photographs of their newborn to a popular glossy tabloid.  The 
same magazine later publishes unflattering pictures of the celebrity 
family without their permission.  If these pictures were used in an 
advertisement card for the magazine, this would certainly 
constitute a violation of the proposed federal statute of the right of 
publicity; this is because the pictures themselves, in conjunction 
with the advertising card, are not “news.”  But what if these 
pictures were instead used as a part of a cover story for the 
magazine’s next issue?  The court would have the opportunity to 
consider the “newsworthiness” of the story—not whether the story 
had merit or was more than mere gossip, because gossip can 
constitute news, but whether the story was more than an attempt to 
trade on the “value” of the family.  Suffice it to say, there is no 
statutory scheme that can completely assuage the tense relationship 
between tabloids and the celebrities they cover; under any 
language, courts would still occasionally be plagued by cases such 
as the ones examined in this Note. 
Clearly, even a federal statute would often require case-by-case 
analyses to distinguish legitimate uses from non-legitimate ones.  
However, a uniform statute would encourage similar results in 
each jurisdiction, following the same statutory language and the 
same body of case law. 
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CONCLUSION 
The right of publicity can represent the delicate balance 
between a humdrum public in line at the supermarket, gawking at 
the latest tabloid headlines, and the seemingly fascinating 
celebrities who stroll Robertson Boulevard, a long line of 
paparazzi in tow.  The right of publicity must acknowledge its 
roots in privacy and the rights of the celebrities by whom we are so 
fascinated, but at the same time, recognize the property aspects that 
make the right of publicity so valuable and worth protecting in the 
first place.  The right of publicity has strange bedfellows for an 
area of the law, from The National Enquirer to Playgirl to Hustler, 
but its lurid appearances should not detract from its worth.  Gossip 
too has a place under the sheltering umbrella of the First 
Amendment.  A federalized right of publicity is necessary to 
acknowledge changing times, changing attitudes, and changing 
expectations of privacy. 
 
